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INTRODUCTION

In 1989, Costa Rica significantly reformed its system of constitutional adjudication. The 1989 reforms and the manner of their implementation have already brought about significant changes in substantive
constitutional law, and have generated considerable controversy about
the proper role of the courts, the appropriate balance among the
branches of government, the virtues of activism and restraint, and
the effect of precedent. These constitutional issues are of importance
and concern to Costa Ricans, but their significance goes beyond the
borders of that small nation. Costa Rica has long been a functioning
democracy, and in an era when countries all over the world are working
to establish constitutional government and to convert democratic
theory into political reality, the constitutional experiences of all democracies are instructive. Moreover, because Costa Rica's constitutional
history has been one of experimentation with a number of approaches
to "controlling constitutionality" (that is, enforcing constitutional
guarantees), its constitutional processes are a rich source of comparative study, made richer. still by the interaction - in different proportions at different times - of Civil Law, Common Law, and indigenous
legal principles and institutions. For these reasons, this article attempts to examine Costa Rica's current system of constitutional adjudication in the context of the institutional development of the country,
and in the broader context of the growth of Western democratic institutions during the past two centuries.
II.

THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND

In theory, Spanish colonial government was absolutist; in practice,
it left little opportunity for popular participation in the affairs of state.1
There were, however, several factors that made Costa Rica's colonial

1. See, e.g., CHARLES GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 90-100 (1966); see also JOHN H. EL1469-1716, at 161-78 (1966).

LIOTr, IMPERIAL SPAIN

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss3/1

2

Barker: Taking Constitutionalism
Seriously:
Costa Rica's Sala Cuarta
COSTA RICA'S SALA
CUARTA

experience conducive to the eventual emergence of democracy. Despite
its name, Costa Rica had few of the natural resources that attracted
Spanish settlers to other parts of the New World. It also lacked a
large indigenous population that might be put to work for European
masters. Thus, the conditions which led to the easy establishment of
colonial aristocracies and sharp social and economic divisions elsewhere
in Spanish America were not present in Costa Rica, or were present
to a much lesser degree.
Very soon after the Conquest it became apparent that those
Spaniards settling in the Central Plateau of Costa Rica would have
to do their own work, on more or less equal terms. The relatively
small Indian populations continued to live in their own communities,
some distance from the centers of Spanish settlement. 2 Costa Rica
itself was remote, far from the seats of Spanish administrative authority. The Captain General was in Guatemala and the Bishop was in
Nicaragua. 3 The Governor of Costa Rica, in Cartago, exercised a degree of power which, by reason of distance, isolation, and poverty,
was much attenuated. 4 Thus, the enervating burden of imperial bureaucracy weighed less heavily in Costa Rica than elsewhere, leaving
some room, and some need, for freedom of action among the farmers
of the Central Plateau.
When the Wars of Liberation broke out across Spanish America,
Costa Rica did not break away from the Crown, it fell away. In the
words of one historian, Costa Rica "received its independence by mail,"
being informed by messenger that the municipal council of Guatemala
had declared the independence of all of Central America some four
weeks earlier. 5 The same factors that had kept the area on the fringe
of Spanish power allowed the newly-independent State of Costa Rica
considerable autonomy during its year-and-a-half affiliation with the
Mexican Empire and its quarter-century association with the turbulent, dictator-prone Central American Federation. Full independence,
which dates from the promulgation of the Republic of Costa Rica in
1848, coincided with the achievement of economic independence

2. An excellent summary of those characteristics of the colonial epoch which were conducive
to the development of democracy is found in Carlos Jos6 Gutirrez, Libertad, Derecho y Desarrollo Politico, in DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COSTARRICENSE 48-54 (Carlos Josd Gutibrrez
ed., 1983).

3.

JORGE SAENZ CARBONELL, EL DESPERTAR CONSTITUCIONAL DE COSTA RICA

127-32

(1985).
4. Id.
5. Gutirrez, supra note 2, at 45.
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through the cultivation and exportation of coffee. 6 Although this led
to the emergence of a "coffee aristocracy," the dangers inherent in
the situation were minimized by several factors. First, the nature of
coffee cultivation in the Central Plateau required even the "aristocrats"
to work closely with their employees. Second, the availability of open
land just beyond the coffee-growing areas permitted pioneers to move
out from the old population centers and establish themselves as small
but independent farmers. Third, from the time the national government began receiving significant revenue from the coffee trade, it
began to invest in education,7 thus reinforcing the ability of a large
percentage of the population to participate, in an orderly way, in
public affairs.
This is not to suggest that there were not dictatorships and invidious discrimination; but the dictatorships were fewer and of shorter
duration, 8 and the discrimination, less severe and less extensive than
in most of Costa Rica's neighbors.9 In short, the conditions were such
that the law could take hold, and democracy could grow.

III.

THE EARLY CONSTITUTIONS

Since gaining its independence from Spain, Costa Rica has had
thirteen constitutions of its own, and in addition was at least technically
subject for brief periods in its early history to the Provisional Regulations of the Mexican Empire and the Constitutions of the Federal
Republic of Central America. 10 Ten of the thirteen Costa Rican constitutions were promulgated prior to 1871, during the fifty-year period
which Costa Rican constitutionalists often refer to as the "era of experimentation."' I The experiments were many: the country moved into

6. The relationship between the economic independence achieved from the export of coffee,
and complete political independence is explained in detail in S.ENZ, supra note 3, at 327-403.
7. See, e.g., RICHARD BIESANZ ET AL., THE COSTA RICANS 49-50 (1982); RALPH L.
WOODWARD, JR., CENTRAL AMERICA: A NATION DIVIDED 171-73 (1985); Gutinrrez, supra
note 2, at 57-62.
8. In this century, constitutional government has been interrupted only twice: 1917-20 and
1948-49.
9. Regarding class, race, and ethnicity, see BIESANZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 53-70.
10. A detailed and intensive study of Costa Rica's constitutional development before 1871
is S; ENZ, supra note 3. Other important works, dealing with all of the country's constitutions,
are MARIO ALBERTO JIMANEZ, DESARROLLO CONSTITUCIONAL DE COSTA RICA (1979) and

HERNAN G. PERALTA, LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE COSTA RICA (1962). The last work includes
the texts of all of the country's constitutions.
11. See Carlos Jos6 Gutinrrez, Sintesis del Proceso Constitucional,in DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COSTARRICENSE, supra note 2, at 19-20 (Carlos Jose Gutidrrez ed., 1983).
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and out of the Central American Federation several times, 12 oscillated
from strong legislatures with weak executives to the opposite arrangement,1 3 tried both bicameral and unicameral legislatures, 14 and, for a
time, even attempted to end local rivalries by rotating the seat of
government every six months among the country's four major cities
(Alajuela, Cartago, Heredia, and San Jos6).15 Similarly, the procedures
for enforcing constitutional guarantees underwent numerous changes.
The French Revolution enormously influenced all parts of the Civil
Law world, including the newly-independent countries of Latin
America. The revolutionists' hatred of the judges of the ancien regime
and their glorification of legislative power caused France to place
ultimate authority for safeguarding the constitution in the legislature,
or in one or another instrumentality of the legislature.16 Spain followed
the French model, providing in its Constitution of 1812 (the Constituci6n of Cdiz) that the legislature should take notice of violations of
the constitution, correct them, and take appropriate action against
those responsible for the violations. 17 The Spanish model, in turn,
influenced much of Spanish America. Costa Rica's early constitutional
documents entrusted the enforcement of constitutional norms to the
legislature, or to specialized agencies thereof. 18 Although this power
appears to have been used to invalidate actions of lower-ranking officials, and might have been used to reverse judicial decisions, it naturally provided no safeguard against unconstitutional legislation. The
system of legislative control of constitutionality has been aptly de-

12. Costa Rica was part of the Federal Republic of Central America established by the
federal constitution of 1824. Costa Rica declared its separation from the federation in 1838, but
rejoined in 1842. In 1848, recognizing that the federation had in fact collapsed, Costa Rica
proclaimed itself a republic and declared full and complete independence. JIMENEZ, supra note
10, at 56-68, 105-08.
13. This "pendulum theory" is developed in some detail by JIMENEZ, supra note 10, at
113-94, and is summarized in CARLOS JosE GUTIi RREZ, EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DEL SISTEMA
JURiDICO 22-25 (1979).
14. Id.
15. The so-called "Ambulatory Law" was enacted in 1834. See JORGE SENZ CARBONELL,
Los ANos DE LA AMBULANCIA 55-65 (1st ed. 1989).
16. CONST. OF YEAR VIII (1799) arts. 21, 28 (France); CONST. OF 1852 arts. 25, 26, 29
(France). The Constitution of Bayonne, the 1808 document prepared at Napoleon's direction for
the governance of Spain, contained a similar arrangement.
17. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA MONARQUiA ESPANOLA (Mar. 19, 1812) art. 372
(Spain).
18. Pacto Social Interino Fundamental de Costa Rica (Dec. 1, 1821), arts. 48-56; Primer
Estatuto Politico de la Provincia de Costa Rica (Mar. 17, 1823), arts. 46-47; Segundo Estatuto
Politico de la Provincia de Costa Rica (May 16, 1823), arts. 50-56.
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scribed by one present-day Costa Rican jurist as, "directing the mice
to safeguard the cheese. ' '19
In 1825, the system became a bit more sophisticated, again in
accordance with French and Spanish models. The Basic Law adopted
that year created a separate branch of government, the Conserving
Power, to be exercised by a Council whose members were popularly
elected.2 The Council had general responsibility to see to the observance of the Basic Law and other laws, and to report violations thereof
to the Congress. The Council was empowered to reject any legislation
which violated the Basic Law or was contrary to the public good.
Thus, for the first time, the constitutionality of legislation was subject
to control by an entity outside the Legislative Branch itself. The power
was exercised with some regularity; however, its significance was
attenuated by the fact that a bill rejected by the Council (whether on
constitutional or policy grounds) could nevertheless become law if reenacted by a two-thirds majority of the Congress. Thus, the Congress
21
could, and often did, override the Council's veto.
All control of constitutionality was eliminated when, after the coup
of 1838, the dictator Braulio Carrillo effectively united all governmental power in himself.- Carrillo's dictatorship was overthrown in 1842;
his 1841 "Law of Bases and Guarantees" was nullified, and the 1825
Constitution was restored as a provisional measure.m The new Constitution of 1844 eliminated the Conserving Power and returned control
of constitutionality to the Congress, by giving the Senate the power
to reject as unconstitutional legislation proposed by the House of Representatives, and to nullify orders and decrees issued by nonlegislative
organs.- The Constitution of 1847 abolished the Senate and charged
the unicameral Congress with the by-then traditional legislative duty
of watching over the Constitution.2
With the Constitution of 1859, Costa Rica reestablished a bicameral
legislature and charged it with maintaining the Constitution.m The

19.

Carlos Jose Guti~rrez, El Subdesarrollodel Derecho Pfiblico, 53 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS

JURiDICAS 58 (1985).

20.
21.

Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica (Jan. 25, 1825), arts. 60-75.
Jorge Sdenz Carbonell, Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidaden Costa Rica (1812-

1937), 1 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 27, 31-35 (1991).

22. JIMENEZ, supra note 10, at 63-65. Ley de Bases y Garantias (Mar. 8, 1841), arts. 4,
5. This law, of constitutional status, was dictated by Carrillo and made him "First Chief' for life.
23. Decreto LXXXVI (Aug. 27, 1842), art. 8.
24. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DEL ESTADO DE COSTA RICA (Apr. 9, 1844) art. 126.
6
25. CONSTITUCI N POLiTICA (Feb. 10, 1847) arts. 69, 188 (Costa Rica).
26. CONSTITUClON POLiTICA (Dec. 27, 1859) arts. 66, 137 (Costa Rica) [hereinafter CONST.
(1859)].
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Constitution also provided, in new and enigmatic language, that any
law, decree or order of the legislature or the executive which was
contrary to the Constitution was null and of no effect.Y The confusion
created by these provisions, and the ineffectiveness of any system
which relied on legislative control, were demonstrated in 1863. The
President, relying on the nullity provision, informed Congress that he
believed a certain provision of the Municipal Law to be unconstitutional.- The Congress, relying on its duty to maintain the Constitution,
responded by declaring the law unconstitutional.2 The President, in
a patently unconstitutional move, dissolved the Congress and ordered
new elections 0
Not surprisingly, subsequent Congresses, also convened under the
1859 Constitution, did not attempt to exercise control over constitutionality.31 On the positive side, the 1859 Constitution did make constitutional supremacy an explicit principle. It also introduced the right
of habeas corpus. Article 37 provided: "The Republic recognizes the
right of Habeas Corpus. The manner of putting this right into practice
shall be determined by law."- Although implementing legislation would
be long in coming, habeas corpus became a permanent part of Costa
Rican constitutional law, and the 1859 guarantee would prove to be
an important step in the development of a comprehensive system for
the enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Constitution of 1869 is significant because of its attempt to
formally involve the judiciary in the process of constitutional control.
It retained the boilerplate language about legislative control,3 but
added a provision empowering the Supreme Court to suspend, on the
petition of any citizen, the enforcement of legislative dispositions contrary to the constitution. After suspending a law, the Supreme Court
was to submit the matter to the Congress, which would definitively
decide the question of its constitutionality. The Constitution of 1869
was abrogated by a coup in the Spring of 1870, and its plan of limited
judicial review was never implemented.3

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. art. 11.
Sienz, supra note 21, at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CONST. (1859) art. 37.

33.

CONSTITUCI N POLiTICA (Apr. 15, 1869) art. 146 (Costa Rica).

34.

Id. art. 135.

35.
36.

Id.
Sdenz, supra note 21, at 39.

6
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1871

Although it was not apparent at the time, the promulgation of the
Constitution of 1871 marked the end of the era of constitutional experimentation. The early constitutions had sought to maintain stability
and liberty by dividing governmental power between the legislative
and executive branches. Whenever one or the other became too powerful, a new constitution was adopted to correct the imbalance;37 but
the ultimate formal safeguard of constitutionality was based on the
French idea of legislative control.
By 1871, certain important aspects of constitutionalism had been
established. First of all, it was clear that the constitution should be
rigid, that is, the constitution should be the supreme law of the land,
and all other legal norms should conform to it (a principle obviously
rejected in the 1825-1838 arrangement under which Congress, by a
qualified majority, could re-enact an unconstitutional law). Second, it
was obvious that the legislature, no matter how structured, could not
be relied on to ensure the constitutionality of statutes and official
conduct. Third, the establishment of habeas corpus in 1859 and of
limited judicial review in 1869 evidenced an increasing belief that
effective enforcement of the constitution required some role for the
judiciary.
The Constitution of 1871 was to remain in effect, with three interruptions, for more than seventy years. It said no more about enforcing
constitutional norms than its predecessors, and did nothing to resolve
the ambiguities of earlier constitutions. The Supremacy Clause (article
17) provided that dispositions of the Legislative or Executive Branch
contrary to the Constitution were void and of no effect, but did not
specify who would decide questions of constitutionality.- Article 132
imposed on the unicameral Congress the usual duty to look for and
correct any violations of the constitution3 The guarantee of habeas
corpus relief was retained 4O,but the 1869 provision for limited judicial
review was eliminated.41 It was within this sparse and unpromising

37.

GUTIE RREZ,

38.

CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA (Dec. 7, 1871) art. 17 (Costa Rica).

supra note 13, at 62-63.

39. Id. art. 132. In 1943, because of the addition of several provisions to the constitution,
art. 132 was re-numbered art. 137.
40. Id. art. 41.
41. Several writers have noted that the constitution of 1871 was in some respects a return
to the principles of the Spanish Constitution of 1812. JIMENEZ, supra note 10, at 138-41; Sgenz,
supra note 21, at 39.
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framework that an effective system of enforcing constitutional norms
would evolve.
Costa Rica's present system of constitutional control may be said
to have begun in 1887, with the promulgation of the Organic Law of
the Tribunals (Organic Law).4 The law prohibited those who administered justice from applying any statutes, decrees, or orders which
were contrary to the Constitution," thereby establishing judicial review as a power and duty of all judges in the country. The same
Organic Law gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas corpus
actions." Despite the Organic Law, the early decades of judicial review
were difficult.
The first recorded exercise of judicial review, Chinchilla v.
Urefta,- decided in 1890, went smoothly enough. A landowner brought
an action against his neighbor to obtain an easement of ingress and
egress across the latter's land. The defendant argued that the provision
of the civil code on which the plaintiff relied violated the constitutionally-guaranteed right of property. The court of first instance declared
the code provision unconstitutional, the court of appeals reversed on
the merits, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
appellate court, again on the merits." The case appears to have attracted little attention.
Two years later, a military officer was convicted by a civilian court
of unlawfully detaining another person. 47 The officer argued that the
court lacked jurisdiction because the crime was by statute an offense
against military discipline, and was therefore within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the military tribunals. The prosecution argued that the
Constitution defined military jurisdiction more narrowly than did the
statute, thereby placing the crime in question within the jurisdiction
of the civilian courts. The Supreme Court held that the civilian court
had jurisdiction." Although the Court did not explicitly declare the

42. Ley Org.nica de Tribunales, Decreto No. 11 (Mar. 29, 1887). The law entered into
effect January 1, 1888.
43. Id. art. 8, § 1,

44.

Id. art. 53, § 5.

45. Sentencia de Casaci6n de las 14 hrs. del 10 de marzo de 1890 (Judgment of 14:00, Mar.
10, 1890, Cass.) (Costa Rican judicial decisions are often identified by the date and time of their
issuance).
46. Id.
47. Sentencia de Casaci6n de las 13 hrs. del 15 de julio de 1892 (Sibaja Case) (Judgment
of 13:00, July 15, 1892, Cass.).
48. Id.
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statute relied on by the soldier to be unconstitutional, it did say that
it was for the judiciary and not the legislature to definitively interpret
the Constitution. 4 9 By refusing to apply the statute, the Court impliedly determined that the statute was unconstitutional.
Habeas corpus had more difficult beginnings. In 1891, President
Jos6 Joaquin Rodriguez suspended constitutional guarantees and imprisoned a number of his political opponents, including the historian
Ricardo Fern.ndez Guardia. The prisoner brought a petition for habeas
corpus, arguing that his confinement was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed and ordered Ferndndez's release. - President Rodriguez ignored the decision. The President of the Supreme Court,
Ricardo Jim6nez Oreamuno, resigned in protest. In the long run, the
case increased public support for the Court, but attempts to strengthen
habeas corpus through legislation to implement the constitutional
guarantee did not succeed until 1909.51

The ambiguity of the Constitution of 1871 about the locus of ultimate authority to decide constitutional questions was underscored by
three events in the first quarter of this century. In 1911, President
Jim~nez Oreamuno (who twenty years earlier had resigned the Supreme Court presidency over the Ferndndez case) declared that two
statutes unconstitutionally infringed on the powers of the presidency
and refused to apply them.- He asserted it was the right and duty
of all who exercised public authority to refuse to apply unconstitutional
laws.m
Four years later, with the outbreak of World War I, the Congress
gave President Aifredo GonzAlez Flores power to legislate in certain
economic and financial matters. Using this power, the president established new prerequisites to the recording of certain documents. An
individual named Alfaro presented a deed for recording, without having complied with the new requirements.- The Register refused to
accept the deed, and Alfaro brought suit to compel him to record it,
arguing that the new prerequisites were the product of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court refused to
apply the new requirements, and ordered that the document be re-

49.

Id.

50. Gutirrez, supra note 19, at 55-56.
51. The legislative struggle which culminated in the Habeas Corpus Law of 1909 is described
in Gutidrrez, supra note 19, at 56-57.
52. Resoluci6n No. 8 de 15 de marzo de 1911 (Mar. 15, 1911).
53. Id.
54. See Sentencia de Casaci6n de las 14:30 de 2 de marzo de 1915 (Alfaro v. Registrador)
(Judgment of 14:30, Mar. 2, 1915, Cass.).
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corded.5 President Gonzilez, fearing that the decision would prevent
him from dealing with the economic crisis brought on by the war,
immediately appealed to the Congress, as the "supreme authority in
constitutional matters," to declare the law (and other laws promulgated
by the President pursuant to his emergency powers) constitutional,
and to ratify the President's actions in the matter. The Congress,
while acknowledging that the Supreme Court had not exceeded its
powers in refusing to apply a law which it believed to be unconstitutional, granted the President's request and ratified the economic
emergency laws.5
Under the pressure of the economic crisis provoked by the European conflict, the government of President Gonzalez fell victim to a
coup led by the Minister of War, Federico Tinoco. Tinoco had himself
elected president and convened a constituent assembly which replaced
the Constitution of 1871 with a new charter. The Tinoco government
itself fell in less than three years. In 1919, the Provisional President,
Francisco Aguilar Barquero, issued a decree declaring that the Tinoco
government was unlawful because it had come to power in violation
of the Constitution of 1871, 57 and that its actions were null and of no
legal effect unless ratified by the Provisional Government. When the
new Congress convened in 1920 (under the 1871 Constitution), it
enacted, over the veto of the new constitutional president, Julio
Acosta, a statute called the Law of Nullities.- The Law of Nullities
declared the constitution and laws promulgated under the Tinoco regime unconstitutional (that is, contrary to the 1871 Constitution).19
As one might expect, the Law of Nullities created problems for
many persons who had acquired rights under laws passed during the
Tinoco regime. A carnival operator whose carousel had been shut
down by municipal authorities sued the municipality and won. 60 On
appeal, the judgment was reversed because the jurisdiction of the
court of first instance was based on a 1918 statute which had been
invalidated by the Law of Nullities. 6 1 The National Treasury refused

55.

Id.

56. Ley No. 2 de 29 de marzo de 1915 (Mar. 29, 1915).
57. Decreto No. 4 de 29 de octubre de 1919 (Oct. 29, 1919).
58. Ley de Nulidades, Ley No. 41 de 21 de agosto de 1920 (Aug. 21, 1920).
59. Id. There was precedent for such a law. In 1842, after the overthrow of the dictator
Carrillo, the newly-convened Constituent Assembly declared Carrillo's constitution (called the
"Law of Bases and Guarantees") and all of his decrees, orders, and regulations, null. Decreto
LXXXVI de 27 de agosto de 1842 (Aug. 27, 1842).
60. Sentencia de Casaci6n de las 15 hrs. del 21 de marzo de 1923 (Castro C6spedes v.
Municipalidad de San Jos6) (Judgment of 15:00, Mar. 21, 1923, Cass.).
61.

Id.
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to pay the holder of a government note issued while Tinoco was in
power. 62 In these and many other disputes, individuals argued that
the Law of Nullities violated the 1871 Constitution. The argument
most frequently made in these disputes was that the Law of Nullities
violated the 1871 Constitution (the argument most frequently made
was that the Law of Nullities violated article 26 of the (1871) Constitution, which provided that laws shall not have retroactive effect). The
Supreme Court, in both of the cases mentioned above, and in other
decisions on the subject, held that the Law of Nullities was not unconstitutional; however, various other courts, in other cases decided during the 1920's, held otherwise. 6 As a practical and legal matter, then,
the Law of Nullities was, at any given time, constitutional in some
courts and unconstitutional in others.
The events of the first quarter of the twentieth century demonstrated two fundamental problems with the system of constitutional
control which had developed under the Constitution of 1871. First of
all, it was not clear what branch of government had the final word in
constitutional matters. The Congress, the President, and the Supreme
Court had each spoken definitively on constitutional questions at one
time or another, and each had deferred, at least implicitly, to each of
the others. This uncertainty, which had its legal roots in the Constitution of 1871 and in the tradition inherited from earlier constitutions,
was compounded by the country's occasional political instability which,
while modest by Latin American standards, was great enough to slow
the development of a system of constitutional decision-making. 4
The second problem was made evident by the Law of Nullities.
Costa Rica had always adhered to the traditional Civil Law principle,
given unprecedented prominence by the French Revolution, that judicial decisions have binding effect only in the cases in which they are
rendered.- Thus, the litigation provoked by the Law of Nullities produced sharp divisions among judges and, because of the public importance of the questions involved, the result was chaotic. The Supreme
Court acknowledged its own limitations, and its virtual withdrawal

62. Sentencia de Casaci6n de las 15:30 hrs. del 7 de diciembre de 1923 (Pacheco Cabezas
v. Estado) (Judgment of 15:30, Dec. 7, 1923, Cass.).
63. The confusion is described and the cases summarized in Sdenz, supranote 21, at 56-61.
64. The Constitution of 1871 was suspended twice: from July 30, 1876 to August 1, 1882;
and from September 11, 1892 to May 1, 1894. In addition, it was abrogated by Tinoco on January
27, 1917, and not fully restored until May 1, 1920.
65. Regarding the impact of the French Revolution on the role of the judiciary, see JOHN

P.

DAWSON,

THE ORACLES OF THE LAW
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from constitutional decision-making, in a 1927 case in which it upheld
the constitutionality of the Law of Nullities. 6The Court acknowledged
its statutory power and duty (based on the Organic Law of the Tribunals) to refrain from applying unconstitutional laws, but said: "it cannot
be maintained that . . . Congress has conferred on the courts the
power to define and control, in substance and form, [Congress'] own
power to make laws, to such an extent as ' '67to permit this court to
decline to apply the . . . [Law of Nullities].
V.

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

It is difficult, and perhaps pointless, to attempt to determine
whether the problems created by the system of constitutional control
in effect since 1888 were ones of underprotection or overprotection of
the Constitution. In either event, the result was unsatisfactory. A
significant step toward order and clarity came with the 1938 reform
of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power (successor to the Organic
Law of the Tribunals). Since 1888, the old Law had provided that
public officials should not apply laws or decrees contrary to the Constitution. The comparable provision of the 1938 Law read: "Those who
administer justice shall not apply laws, decrees, orders, or resolutions
which are contrary to the Constitution, when their inapplicabilityhas
been determined by the Supreme Court.'" (The italicized language
was added in 1938).
In the same year, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended to
create a new form of action, the action of unconstitutionality, 69 by
which a litigant in an ordinary case could challenge the constitutionality
of a statute or decree relevant to his case by bringing a separate and
distinct action, called an action of unconstitutionality, in the Supreme
Court. Upon commencement of the action, the Supreme Court would
instruct the judge before whom the petitioner's case was pending not
to enter judgment until the questions of unconstitutionality raised by

66. Sentencia de Casaci6n de las 13:45 hrs. del 5 de julio de 1927 (G6mez Braga v. El
Estado) (Judgment of 13:45, July 5, 1927, Cass.).
67. Id.
68. Ley OrgAnica del Poder Judicial [Organic Law of the Judicial Power], Ley No. 8 de 29
de noviembre de 1937 (Nov. 29, 1937), art. 8 (effective Jan. 1, 1938). The article was repealed
in 1989.
69. C6digo de Procedimientos Civiles [Code of Civil Procedure], Ley No. 50 del 25 de enero
de 1933, as amended, arts. 962-69 (effective Jan. 1, 1938). The entire code was repealed and
replaced by the C6digo Procesal Civil, Ley No. 7130 del 16 de agosto de 1989 (Aug. 16, 1989),
which entered into effect May 3, 1990.
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the action were decided by the Supreme Court. Similar notice was
given to the entire judiciary not to apply the challenged law until its
constitutionality was determined. The petitioner then submitted a
written brief in support of his allegations of unconstitutionality, and
other parties to pending suits involving the challenged statute were
permitted to submit briefs as well. The Public Ministry also had the
right to file a brief. The case was decided on the briefs, without oral
argument. If the Supreme Court, by an absolute two-thirds majority,
determined that the law was unconstitutional, then that law could not
be applied in the underlying case or in any proceeding thereafter.
The 1938 reforms had two principal effects: to establish judicial
supremacy in constitutional matters and to concentrate judicial review
in the Supreme Court. The latter was done not only to end the confusion and inconsistency which had characterized the previous system,
but also as a sign of respect for the other branches of government.
Many legislators who otherwise favored judicial review believed it
was inappropriate to permit judges of the lowest courts to overrule
the highest executive and legislative authorities. Similarly, the twothirds requirement was an important gesture to the political branches
of government, designed to ensure that only in those instances where
unconstitutionality was clear could the Supreme Court set aside the
dispositions of the other branches.70
Discussion continues among Costa Rican constitutional scholars
over the extent to which the example of the United States influenced
the 1938 reforms. One of the principal sponsors of the reforms has
stated that the United States model, as adapted by Argentina, served
as a guide. 71 There is an important similarity in that Costa Rica, like
the United States and Argentina and unlike most European Civil Law
countries, permitted the adjudication of constitutional questions only
when such questions arose in the context of actual lawsuits between
adversary litigants; but the Costa Rican decision to concentrate judicial
review in a single tribunal, the Supreme Court, was an obvious departure from the United States model. In another respect, the United
States experience was important, but in a negative way. In 1935 and
1936, when the Costa Rican reforms were being drafted, many Costa
Ricans feared judicial supremacy in constitutional matters would lead
to the same problem which the United States was then experiencing:
that is, that the judges would use judicial review of constitutionality

70.

ANTONIO PicADo, EXPLICACION DE LAS REFORMAS A LA LEY ORGANICA DEL

PODER JUDICIAL 27 (1st ed. 1937).

71.

This statement, by Antonio Picado, is evaluated in

CONTROL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES 93
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as a pretext for substituting their own policy preferences for those of
the other branches of government. The desire to avoid such a situation
was an important reason for the requirement that declarations of unconstitutionality be by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
Court.7
Although the 1938 reforms appeared to establish a clear and complete arrangement for constitutional control based on judicial review,
it soon became evident there was a significant gap in the system. The
1940s were a turbulent decade in Costa Rica, in part because of the
widespread belief that the government of President Rafael Calder6n
Guardia, since 1942 in alliance with the Communist Party, had rigged
the 1944 elections to secure the presidency for the government candidate, Teodoro Picado. As popular dissatisfaction increased, the government became more heavy-handed. In 1947, the police closed four opposition radio stations.7 The station owners brought a habeas corpus
action, alleging that the closing of the stations violated their constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of speech. (Since Costa Rican judges, like
Civil Law judges elsewhere, have no general power to grant injunctive
relief, the station owners believed, probably correctly, that habeas
corpus was the only proceeding which might provide them with effective - that is, timely - relief.) The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that habeas corpus was limited to cases of illegal detention. 74 The closing of the stations, and other repressive government
actions, including the annulling of the 1948 presidential election (apparently won by the opposition candidate Otilio Ulate), led to armed
conflict, from which the insurgents, led by Jos6 Figueres, emerged
victorious. The provisional government, headed by Figueres, called
elections for a constituent assembly. The assembly wrote a new Constitution, which entered into effect November 7, 1949, and has been
in operation ever since.
VI.

THE CONSTITUTION OF

1949

The Constitution of 1949 gave the 1938 reforms constitutional
status. Article 10 provided, in pertinent part:
Dispositions of the Legislative Branch or of the Executive Branch contrary to the Constitution shall be absolutely
null.. .
The Supreme Court of Justice, by vote of no less than
two-thirds of all its members, has the power to declare the

72. ANTONIO PicADO, EXPLICACION DE LAS REFORMAS AL C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES 418-19 (1937).
73. Sesifn Extraordinaria de la Corte Plena del 25 de julio de 1947 (July 25, 1947).
74. Id.
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unconstitutionality of dispositions of the Legislative Branch
and decrees of the Executive Branch.
It shall be determined by statute which tribunals shall
have jurisdiction to determine the unconstitutionality of
other dispositions of the Executive Branch.7 5
Because the limitations of habeas corpus had been demonstrated
in 1947, some members of the Constituent Assembly wanted to replace
it with amparo, a summary procedure created in mid-nineteenth century Mexico to protect all individual rights. 76 However, the assembly
decided instead to retain habeas corpus as a protection against illegal
detention and to adopt a limited version of amparo to protect all those
constitutional rights not protected by habeas corpus.- Article 48 of
the new Constitution provided that habeas corpus would remain within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and amparo jurisdiction would be determined by statute.78
Another new review procedure created by the 1949 Constitution
was judicial review of presidential vetoes. Article 128 provided that
if the president vetoed a bill on grounds that it was unconstitutional,
and the Legislative Assembly re-passed the bill without meeting the
president's constitutional objections, then the Supreme Court would
decide the constitutionality of the disputed provision. 9 If the Court,
by a two-thirds vote, decided that the provision was indeed unconstitutional, then the Assembly would be required either to make appropriate changes in the bill or abandon the project.- Otherwise, the bill
would be determined to be constitutional and the president could not
again veto it on grounds of unconstitutionality.8 '
The Constitution of 1949 established a Legislative Power, exercised
by a unicameral Legislative Assembly whose fifty-seven members,
called deputies, are elected by direct popular vote for four-year terms

75. CONSTITUcioN POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA (1949) art. 10 (since
amended) [hereinafter CONSTITUCIoN]. A thorough study of the action of unconstitutionality
under the system that prevailed from 1949 to 1989 is found in RUBEN HERNANDEZ VALLE,
EL CONTROL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES, passim (1988).
76. For an explanation of the Mexican amparo, see Hector Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 306 (1979).
77. The discussion by the Constituent Assembly is summarized in Gutinrrez, supra note
19, at 63.
78. CONSTITUCIoN art. 48.
79. CONSTITUci6N art. 128; see also RUBEN HERN; NDEZ VALLE, LA TUTELA DE LOS
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 229-44 (1990).
80. See supra note 79.
81. Id.
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and are not eligible for immediate re-election8 2 The Executive Power
is exercised by the President, who is elected by direct popular vote
for a four-year term, and by the Ministers of Government, who head
the various executive departments and are appointed by the President. 3 The country also has two Vice-Presidents, elected by direct
popular vote for terms which coincide with that of the President. 8
The Constitution originally permitted the re-election of a former president who had been out of office for at least eight years, but a 1969
amendment now prohibits any presidential re-election.8
The judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice
and such other tribunals as are established by law.1 Until 1989, the
Supreme Court was composed of 17 members, called magistrates,
elected by the Legislative Assembly for eight-year terms and retained
for additional eight-year terms unless opposed by a two-thirds majority
of the Assembly.87 Until 1989, the Supreme Court was divided into
three chambers. The First Chamber, until 1989 composed of seven
magistrates, has cassation8 jurisdiction in most civil, commercial, and
contentious-administrative matters. 9 The Second Chamber, then and
now composed of five magistrates, has cassation jurisdiction in successions, bankruptcy, and family law.- The Third Chamber, also composed of five magistrates, has cassation jurisdiction in criminal matters. 9' The entire Court (Corte Plena) selects its own president and
the presidents of the respective chambers, 92 appoints the members of
the lower courts,93 and exercises administrative control over the entire

82. CONSTITUCI6N arts. 105-107. The Constitution of 1949 originally set the number of
deputies at 45, but a constitutional amendment in 1961 increased the number to 57.
83. CONSTITUCI 6 N arts. 130, 134, 138, 139(1).
84. Id. arts. 135, 136, 138.
85. Id. art. 132, inciso 1, amended by Ley No. 4349 de 11 de julio de 1969 (July 11, 1969).
86. Id. art. 152.
87. The selection and tenure of magistrates are established by art. 158 of the Constitution
of 1949. The number of magistrates was (and is) determined by statute and, until 1989, was
set by arts. 61, 63, and 65 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. Since the adoption of the
1949 Constitution, only one incumbent Supreme Court magistrate who sought an additional term
has been rejected by the Legislative Assembly.
88. "Cassation" is review by a higher tribunal of a lower court decision for error of law.
It is thus roughly equivalent to appellate review as practiced in the United States. In civil law
countries, "appeal" denotes review by a higher court as to fact and law. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN,
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 39-41, 120-21 (2d ed. 1985).
89. Organic Law of the Judicial Power, art. 61.
90. Id. art. 63.
91. Id. art. 65.
92. CONSTITUCI6N art. 162.
93. Organic Law of the Judicial Power, art. 71(4).
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Judicial Branch.- Until 1989, it also had original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions of unconstitutionality and petitions for habeas
corpus. 95 Magistrates of the Supreme Court may be removed from
office only for cause, and only by a two-thirds majority of the Court
itself.9 All legislative bills that affect the organization or operation of
the judiciary must be submitted to the Supreme Court for review
and, if opposed by the Court, may become law only if approved by a
two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly. 97 The Constitution
requires that at least six percent of the government's ordinary revenues be allocated to the Judicial Branch. 98
The Legislative Assembly, by statute, has established three levels
of tribunals below the Supreme Court. They are, in ascending order,
alcaldes, district judges, and Superior Tribunals. Alcaldes have jurisdiction over minor civil matters and are roughly equivalent to justices
of the peace. 99 District judges have original jurisdiction in civil, commercial, contentious-administrative, labor, and juvenile matters, and
over lesser crimes.1°° Superior Tribunals, which usually sit in threejudge panels, have original jurisdiction in major criminal cases, and
appellate jurisdiction over most decisions of district judges.0° In keeping with its Civil Law tradition, Costa Rica has no juries.
The Constitution guarantees individual rights similar to those found
in the constitutions of most other Western nations, and a number of
social and economic guarantees as well.- °2
By any test, the Constitution of 1949, and the system of judicial
review which it established, functioned well.-° The Constitution itself
has been in continuous operation since November 7, 1949. Elections
have been free and orderly, opposition candidates have often won the
presidency, and control of the Legislative Assembly has frequently

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

art. 156; Organic Law of the Judicial Power, arts. 71(5), (10).
Organic Law of the Judicial Power, art. 71(1), (8).
CONSTITUCION art. 165.
Id. art. 167.
Id. art. 177,
2.
Organic Law of the Judicial Power, arts. 89-97.
CONSTITUCION

Id. arts. 79-88.

101. Id. arts. 78, 78 bis.
102. Individual rights and guarantees are set forth in articles 10-49; social rights and guarantees in articles 50-74; rights and duties related to education and culture, articles 76-89; political
rights and duties, articles 90-98. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by article 75.
103. For a survey of Costa Rica's system of constitutional adjudication prior to the 1989
reforms, see Robert S. Barker, ConstitutionalAdjudication in Costa Rica, 17 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 249 (1986).
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shifted from one party to another. ,o4The judiciary is independent, and
judicial decisions are obeyed.10 5 The country's human rights record has
been very good.1° Nevertheless, by the 1980's there was serious and
increasing criticism of the system of constitutional adjudication. Some
of the criticisms had to do with the structure of the system, while
others were directed at the manner of implementation.
Some critics argued the allocation of adjudicatory authority made
little sense: actions of unconstitutionality and habeas corpus were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the full Supreme Court.107 Amparo
actions were within the original jurisdiction of either the First
Chamber of the Supreme Court or a district judge, depending on the
rank of the respondent official. °8 Amparo decisions of the First
Chamber were not reviewable, while decisions of district judges were
reviewable (in cassation) by the Third Chamber of the Supreme
Court.1o9 The constitutionality of statutes and executive orders could
be challenged only before the full Supreme Court by means of an
action of unconstitutionality,l ° but the constitutionality of administrative regulations and municipal ordinances could be decided by a district
judge in an ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding, and reviewed by a Superior Tribunal on appeal.", Another structural anom-

104. BIESANZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 177-207; WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 224-29.
105. See Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1987).
106. See 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 Amnesty International Reports. The 1986 Report
discusses matters that are isolated and minor. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 143 (1986).
The other four Reports mention no real or suspected human rights violations.
107. CONSTITUcION arts. 10, 48 (both since amended).
108. Ley de Amparo [Law of Amparo], No. 1161 del 2 de junio de 1950 (June 2, 1950) art.
6, amended by Organic Law of the Judicial Power, art. 61(3). The Law of Amparo was repealed
in 1989, as was art. 61(3) of Organic Law of the Judicial Power.
109. Law of Amparo, art. 14.
110. CONSTITUcION art. 10 (since amended).
111. The general rule was (and is) that in ordinary litigation a court could not decide a
claim or defense based on the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute or decree. The Supreme
Court exercised exclusive jurisdiction of such matters in the action of unconstitutionality. However, the provisions of the Constitution and the Code of Civil Procedure limit the action of
unconstitutionality to the review of enactments of the Legislative or the Executive Power. See
Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 69. In the decades since the adoption of the Constitution
there was a substantial increase in the number and importance of autonomous administrative
agencies with rulemaking power. The rules promulgated by those agencies, and the ordinances
enacted by the country's municipalities, were not enactments of the Legislative or Executive
Power and thus were not subject to review by the action of unconstitutionality. Amparo was
likewise ineffective because of the judicially-created rule, discussed infra, that where the conduct
complained of was undertaken in reliance on a statute, decree, rule, or ordinance, relief would
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aly, the critics noted, was the fact that some constitutional questions,
such as those raised by habeas corpus, amparo, or contentious-administrative actions) could be decided by either a single judge or a simple
majority, while others (such as those presented in an action of unconstitutionality or review of a presidential veto) were subject to the
two-thirds rule. The two-thirds requirement in unconstitutionality and
veto cases was also seen by some as establishing a "minority veto" in
1 12
constitutional matters.
Critics also charged that habeas corpus and amparo had been too
limited, by statute or by judicial decision, to effectively protect constitutional rights. The Habeas Corpus Law limited the Supreme
Court's inquiry to the following:
(1) whether the authority responsible for the detention
or restriction had jurisdiction to order such detention or
restriction;
(2) whether the act of which the petitioner is accused is
punishable by a law enacted prior to the act;
(3) whether the detention is made in violation of article
40 of the Constitution [which prohibits cruel and degrading
treatment, perpetual punishment, and confiscation of property, and provides that any statement obtained by violence
is null];
(4) whether the petitioner was tried and convicted by
judgment of a competent authority and whether a final sentence has been imposed upon [the petitioner];
(5) whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner
is one which is provided for by law;
(6) whether the order of detention or restriction of liberty
was made pursuant to a lawful suspension of individual
guarantees; and
(7) in case of a lawful suspension of individual guarantees
[as described in item 6, immediately13above], whether those
guarantees have yet been restored.1

not be granted. To fill the gap, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law,
adopted in 1966, expressly extended jurisdiction in contentious-administrative cases to include
questions of the constitutionality of rules promulgated by administrative agencies and
municipalities. Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicci6n Contenciosa-Administrativa (No. 3667 de 12
de marzo de 1966) (Mar. 12, 1966), art. 20(2) (since repealed). Jurisdiction to review contentiousadministrative decisions for error of law was given to the First Chamber of the Supreme Court
by article 61(1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. See Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, El Control
de Constitucionalidaden Costa Rica: Antecedentes Histdricos, IUSTITIA No. 50, at 12-13 (Feb.
1991).
112. HERNANDEZ, supra note 71, at 114.
113. Ley de Habeas Corpus (No. 35 de 24 de noviembre de 1932) (Nov. 24, 1932), art. 9
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It was frequently observed that the Law precluded inquiry into important matters such as the existence of probable cause for the detention.
Amparo was severely limited by the judicially-created rule that
relief could be granted only where the conduct complained of was
arbitrary.11 4 This meant that if the respondent official had acted in
reliance on a statute or regulation, his conduct was not arbitrary, and
amparo would not be granted. 115 Even if the statute or regulation was
inapplicable to the situation, had been misinterpreted by the official,
or was itself unconstitutional, the respondent's reliance was sufficient
to defeat the petitioner's claim for relief.116
Another criticism of amparo was that it was available only against
governmental conduct. A victim of unlawful private conduct was required to pursue ordinary actions, which proceeded much more slowly,
were more expensive, and, because judges lacked the equity powers
of their Common Law counterparts, offered more limited relief. Many
of the individual guarantees contained in the Costa Rican Constitution
- unlike similar guarantees in the United States Constitution - are
framed not only as limitations on government, but as general guarantees, thus limiting private as well as governmental conduct.117 For
these reasons, it was argued, amparo ought to be expanded to provide
protection against private persons as well as public officials.
Perhaps the most pervasive criticism, and the most difficult to
evaluate, was that the Supreme Court was simply too deferential to
the other branches of government and therefore overly reluctant to
find laws and actions unconstitutional. Most Supreme Court magistrates were career judges who had never been required (or permitted)

(since repealed). The operation of habeas corpus prior to 1989 is explained in RUBiN HERNANDEZ VALLE, LAS LIBERTADES PPBLICAS EN COSTA RICA 63-66 (1980).
114. E.g., Corte Plena, Sentencia No. 147 de las 14 hrs. de 21 de noviembre de 1960
(Judgment of 14:00, Nov. 27, 1960). The operation of amparo prior to 1989 is explained, and
the "arbitrariness rule" is forcefully criticized, in HERNANDEZ, supra note 71, at 66-76.
115. See supra note 114.
116. Id.
117. For example, article 29 provides:
Everyone may communicate ideas orally or in writing and publish them without
prior censorship....
Article 33, which originally guaranteed only "equality before the law," was
amended in 1968 by the addition of the provision that, 'there shall be no discrimination whatever contrary to human dignity."
Article 60 provides, in pertinent part that, "Employers and workers are free
to organize themselves in order to obtain and retain economic, social, and professional benefits."
CONSTITUCION arts. 29, 33, 60.
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to decide constitutional questions prior to their elevation to the highest
court. This lack of experience with constitutional questions, coupled
with the two-thirds rule and the message of restraint implicit therein,
may have made the magistrates reluctant to find unconstitutionality
either in statutes or in executive conduct. (It is true that the Supreme
Court denied relief in a large majority of constitutional cases that
came before it, but statistics may indicate nothing more than that the
claims themselves lacked merit. The point is that many jurists wanted
the Court to become more active. They wanted a new constitutional
atmosphere.) 118

VII.

THE 1989 REFORMS

The 1989 reforms had their formal beginning in 1982, when the
then-Minister of Justice, Carlos Jos6 Guti~rrez, suggested to the Supreme Court the need for a "law of constitutional jurisdiction" to
systematize and modernize constitutional adjudication. The Ministry
of Justice organized a Special Commission, chaired by Minister Guti~r-.
rez, and the Supreme Court authorized one of its members, Magistrate
Fernando Coto Alban, to participate in the work of the Commission.
The Commission began meeting in August 1982, and used as its point
of departure a draft of the Organic Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction
prepared earlier that year by Dr. Ruben Hernndez Valle, a Professor
of Constitutional Law and a member of the Commission. The Commission produced its first draft in October 1983.119 The document was the
subject of extensive public discussion that led the Commission to prepare a second draft, which it sent to the Supreme Court in June,
1985. The Court made significant revisions and transmitted its revised
draft to the Legislative Assembly in May 1986.120
The Assembly, in turn, made numerous changes in the Court's
proposal and, as required by the Constitution, submitted the document, now in the form of a bill, to the Court. In August 1989, the
Court formally made sixteen objections to various provisions of the

118. See, e.g., HERNANDEZ, supra note 71, at 110-16; Carlos Josd Gutisrrez, Control de
Constitucionalidad en Costa Rica, Speech Delivered in the Supreme Court of Justice of El
Salvador (June, 1989). Another much-criticized part of the pre-1989 system was the rule, found
in article 967 of the Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 69, that once the Court had declared
that a law was not unconstitutional, subsequent unconstitutionality actions raising the same
issues would not be entertained.
119. Special Commission of the Ministry of Justice of Costa Rica, Proyecto de Ley Orginica
de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional (Oct. 1983).
120. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Proyecto de Ley Organica de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional
(May 6, 1986).
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bill. 121 The Assembly acceded to some of the Court's objections, overrode others, and passed the bill. On October 11, 1989, the bill was
approved by President Oscar Arias Sanchez and became the Law of
Constitutional Jurisdiction. - Earlier in 1989, in a parallel process, the
Assembly initiated and approved three constitutional amendments designed to accommodate the new jurisdictional law.'-

VIII.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

The 1989 reforms consist of the amendment of articles 10, 48, and
128 of the Constitution,'A and the enactment of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (the Law).'- The reforms establish a new, Fourth
Chamber of the Supreme Court, called the Sala Cuarta or Sala Constitutional (the Sala), with exclusive, non-reviewable jurisdiction in
constitutional matters.126 The Sala is composed of seven Magistrates
elected by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly. 127 Two
of the original seven were chosen from among the members of the
First Chamber (thereby reducing the size of the First Chamber to
five), and the remaining members were new to the Court.
The Preliminary Provisions of the Law make a number of important changes. The definition of "constitutional jurisdiction" is expanded
to include the protection of the supremacy not only of "constitutional
norms," but also of "constitutional principles."', The Sala has utilized

121. Letter (No. 5765-89) from Gerardo 0. Arce Portuguez, Acting Secretary of the Supreme
Court of Justice, to Allen Arias Angulo, President of the Legislative Assembly (Aug. 18, 1989).
In September, 1989, the Court sent its full report to the Assembly. Corte Suprema de Justicia,
Proyecto de Ley Orgbnica de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional: Informe Para Contestar la Consulta
de la Asamblea (Sept. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Informe].
122. Ley de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional [Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction], Ley No.
7135 de 11 de octubre de 1989 (Oct. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction].
123. Reforma a los Articulos 10, 48, 105 y 128 de la Constituci6n Politica, Ley No. 7128
de 18 de agosto de 1989 (Aug. 18, 1989). The amendments to articles 10, 48, and 128 are
discussed infra. The amendment to article 105 does not deal with constitutional jurisdiction.
The power to amend the Constitution resides in the Legislative Assembly, which must follow
special procedures, vote numerous times, and approve the amendment by a two-thirds majority.
The President plays a consultative role in the process. CONSTITUCION art. 195.
124. See Reforma a los Articlos 10, 48, 105 y 128 de la Constituci6n Politica.
125. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122.
126. CONSTITUcION art. 10 (amended 1989); Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note
122, arts. 4, 11. Article 7 of the Law gives the Sala exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions
concerning its own jurisdiction.
127. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 4, 2.
128. See id. arts. 1-14.
129. Id. art. 1; see also id. art. 3.
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this provision, finding, for example, that a "multiparty system" (something not explicitly guaranteed in the constitutional text) is a "princi13°
ple" of constitutional law.
Constitutional jurisdiction is further expanded to include the norms
and principles of international human rights law in effect in Costa
Rica. 31 This elevation of international law has two aspects. First, the
enforcement of human rights derived from International Law is now
within the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sala even where those
rights are not guaranteed in the Constitution; and second, the resolution of conflicts between ordinary laws and international treaties is
now also part of constitutional jurisdiction. The Sala has utilized its
international-law jurisdiction to declare that a statute terminating the
pension rights of certain public officials convicted of crimes was unconstitutional because it violated, among other norms, the Convention of
the International Labor Organization.132 Similarly, the Sala declared
unconstitutional a provision of the Family Support Law because it did
not provide the right of appeal which the Sala found to be guaranteed
by the American Convention on Human Rights.1The Law provides that the jurisprudence of the Sala in constitutional matters is binding erga omnes, except upon the Sala itself.'3
This is as important change. Prior to 1989, statutes and regulations
declared unconstitutional by a two-thirds majority of the full Supreme
Court became "absolutely null" by virtue of the express language of
article 10 of the Constitution. However, decisions in habeas corpus
and amparo cases bound only the parties. As part of the 1989 reforms,
the nullification language was deleted from article 10. This change
appears to have been made to eliminate the retroactivity problems
sometimes created by the "absolutely null" language. Under the new
system, all unconstitutionality, habeas corpus and amparo decisions
constitute binding precedent, and it is for the Sala itself to determine
the retrospective effect, if any, of each decision.-

130. Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 980 de las 13:30 hrs. del 24 de mayo de 1991 (May 24,
1991).
131. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 1.
132. Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 1147 de las 16:00 hrs. del 21 de septiembre de 1990
(Sept. 21, 1990).
133. Id.; Sala Constiticional, Voto No. 282 de las 17:00 hrs. del 13 de marzo de 1990 (Mar.
13, 1990).
134. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 13.
135. Article 91 of the Law provides that the effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality
shall be retroactive to the date on which the norm entered into effect, without prejudice,
however, to rights acquired in good faith. The same article proceeds to authorize the Sala to
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Interestingly, when the Supreme Court reviewed the proposed
Law in September 1989, prior to its passage, the Court recommended
that the "binding effect" provision be extended to include the Sala's
interpretations of statutes which it finds not to be unconstitutional.136
This recommendation was not adopted by the Legislature and consequently is not part of the Law. It remains to be seen how much of
the Sala's decisions will come to have binding effect. Other dimensions
of the "binding effect" rule will be discussed hereinbelow, as will
certain other general provisions of the 1989 reforms.
IX.

HABEAS CORPUS

The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction expressly repeals the
Habeas Corpus Law of 1932,1 7 and establishes new rules for habeas
corpus actions. 13 Habeas corpus now provides protection not only
against governmental acts, but against omissions as well; and, whereas
the old law provided relief only from unlawful denials of liberty, the
new Law makes habeas corpus available as well against unlawful
threats, interferences and restrictions on liberty.- The purpose of
to
this change is to give habeas corpus a "preventive" dimension,
140
provide protection against, for example, police harassment.
Perhaps the most important changes in habeas corpus law are those
which require the judge who orders the detention of a suspected
criminal to give a clear explanation of the legal and factual basis for
the detention, and of the evidence against the prisoner.141 In the past,
it was usually sufficient for the judge to state that, "there is evidence"
to support the detention. Now the Sala can and does scrutinize the
evidence in habeas corpus proceedings to determine its sufficiency. As in the past, a respondent may be ordered to take such action,
such as releasing the prisoner, as may be necessary to place the
petitioner in the full enjoyment of his right of liberty.- Under the

make such adjustments in this regard as may be necessary to avoid serious insecurity, injustice,
or disruption of social peace.
136. Irnforme, supra note 121, at 13-14.
137. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 113(a).
138. Id. arts. 15-28.
139. Id. art. 15.
140.

See

RUBEN HERNANDEZ VALLE,

LA TUTELA

DE LOS DERECHOS

52-53 (1990).
141. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122,
Miguel Villalobos Umafta, Legal Assistant to the Sala (June
142. Interview with Lic. Jos6 Miguel Villalobos Umafia,
4, 1990).
143. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122,

FUNDAMEN-

TALES
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new system, the Sala may also order the respondent to pay money
damages to the petitioner.'" This provision was adopted over the
objection of the Supreme Court, which pointed out that there was
already a procedure for recovering damages from public officials who
might discourage
abuse their authority, and that the new procedure
5
the police from acting in doubtful situations.14
During the drafting process, some had argued for the extension of
habeas corpus to protect against actions of private persons who deprive
others of liberty (as, for example, by telephone harassment, or denial
of an easement of ingress and egress),146 but this proposal was not
adopted.
X.

AMPARO

The 1989 Amendment of article 48 of the Constitution expanded
amparo so that it now protects not only all constitutional rights not
protected by habeas corpus, but also all rights acquired under inter147
national law which are not protected by habeas corpus.
The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction expressly repeals the Amparo Law of 1950,14 and establishes its own rules governing amparo
actions. 49 The Law expands amparo in several important ways. It
eliminates the old, judicially-created "non-arbitrariness" defense, by
which public officials could prevail by showing that they acted in
reliance on a statute or regulation. The Law provides that amparo is
available not only against arbitrary conduct, but also against conduct
based on legal norms that are incorrectly interpreted by the official
or mistakenly believed by the official to be applicable to the situation
at hand.- 5° The Law makes clear, as prior law did not, that amparo
protects against the unconstitutional application of a facially constitutional statute or regulation.' 51
During the preparatory phase of the work on the Law, the Supreme
Court recommended that questions of international and intragovernmental relations be expressly excluded from the protective scope

144. Id. art. 26, 2.
145. Informe, supra note 121, at 17-19.
146. Rub6n Herndndez Valle, "Sugerencias de reformas al proyecto de Ley Orgdnica de la
Jurisdicei6n Constitucional" (to Lic. Carlos Manuel Monge Rodriguez, Pres., Comisi6n Permanente de Asuntos Juridicos, Asamblea Legislativa, Aug. 31, 1987), at 1-3.
147. CONSTITUCION art. 48 (amended 1989).
148. Law of Constitutional jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 113(b).
149. Id. arts. 29-72.
150. Id. art. 29, 3.
151. Id.
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of amparo on the grounds that amparo was meant to protect only
individual rights and that the constitutional separation of powers required that political questions be non-justiciable.152 The Legislative
Assembly rejected this proposal, thereby apparently indicating that
such "political" matters should be subject to review in amparo. Whatever may be the merits of this decision, it is consistent with the overall
tendency of the Law to expand amparo.
Another liberalization of amparo is the abandonment ofthe requirement that an amparo petitioner first exhaust ordinary legal procedures
unless recourse to such procedures would cause undue delay.' In the
same vein, the new Law changes the rules concerning the suspensive
effect of the commencement of an amparo action. Prior to 1989, although the amparo court had authority to order such suspension to
prevent serious or irreparable harm pending adjudication of the merits,
the filing of an amparo petition did not operate to suspend the activity
complained of.14 The new Law reverses the procedure: the filng of
an amparo petition has the effect of preliminarily enjoining the conduct
complained of, unless the Sala orders otherwise.
In amparo, as in habeas corpus, a successful petitioner may now
receive money damages from the government agency of which the
respondent official is a functionary,'- and also from the offending
individual if his conduct violates the Law of Public Administration. 157
The imposition of personal liability on a public employee guilty of
official misconduct is not new; however, in the past such liability was
determined in a separate proceeding. Now in both habeas corpus and
amparo, the determination of liability for money damages is within
the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sala, although the calculation of
damages remains within the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals. The
Supreme Court opposed this provision for the same reasons that it
opposed the adjudication of liability for damages in habeas corpus

cases. '5
One of the most important extensions of amparo is its availability,
under the new Law, to obtain relief against acts of private parties.

152. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Proyecto: Ley Org~anica de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional
(1986), art. 29(2); Informe, supra note 121, at 23-24.
153. Compare Law of Amparo, art. 3(d) with Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra
note 122, art. 31.
154. Law of Amparo, art. 13.
155. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 41.
156. Id.
157. Id. art. 51.
158. Informe, supra note 121, at 33-36.
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Article 57 of the Law provides that amparo actions may be maintained
against private persons not only when such persons are performing
or are charged by law with performing public functions, but also when
they are, in law or fact, in such positions of power that ordinary
remedies would not adequately protect the rights of the injured per159
son.
Amparo against private persons was one of the most controversial
parts of the 1989 reforms. Its advocates argued that large and powerful
private entities such as business enterprises and labor unions often
have been able to engage in clearly unlawful activities such as dumping
and illegal strikes, thereby injuring large numbers of people while
ordinary litigation dragged on.160 Opponents of expansion argued that
it is always government that poses the greatest threat to liberty, and
that the efficacy of amparo against governmental actions will be diminished as the Sala becomes overwhelmed with private amparo suits
that have little or nothing to do with constitutional rights. 161
The desire for amparo against private parties is understandable
when one recalls that Costa Rican judges (like judges in most civil
law countries) have no general powers comparable to the equity powers
enjoyed by judges in Common Law systems.16 Amparo proceedings
are unusual in that the tribunal may issue the equivalent of mandatory
or prohibitory injunctions and, because of the summary nature of the
action, may act quickly. 1 The expansion of amparo to private disputes
is also seen as a logical part of constitutional jurisdiction since many
declarations of rights in the Costa -Rican Constitution are not only
limitations on government, but guarantees as against the whole
world.1 Whatever may prove to be the merits of amparo against
private parties, the critics have been proven right in at least one
respect: the Sala is overwhelmed with amparo petitions, and the backlog is increasing.Amparo actions, whether against public officials or private persons,
may now be brought by "any person.16 4 The Supreme Court objected
to this liberalization, preferring the retention of the old rule that only

159. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 57.
160. Hernindez, supra note 146, at 8.
161. Interview with Dr. Fernando Volio Jimnez, Professor of Constitutional Law and
former President of the Legislative Assembly (June 4, 1990) [hereinafter Volio Interview].

162.

MERRYMAN,

163.
164.
165.
166.

Amparo procedure is explained in HERNA NDEZ, supra note 71, at 93-100.
See supra note 117.
1.571 Casos PresentadosAnte la Sala IV, LA REPUBLICA, Sept. 26, 1990, at 11A.
Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, arts. 33, 58.

supra note 88, at 55.
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in exceptional cases (such as claims on behalf of minors or disabled
persons) could anyone other than the injured person commence an
amparo action.167 It is not clear how much this relaxation of the standing requirement will encourage meddlesome suits.
Before 1989, actions of the Supreme Court, inferior courts and
other personnel of the Judicial Power were not subject to review in
amparo.168 Under the new system, exercises of adjudicatory power
by the courts remain exempt from amparo review, but administrative
(for example, managerial) decisions are now reviewable.169 This new
system means, for example, that decisions of the full Supreme Court
concerning the governance and operation of the Judicial Power are
reviewable by the Sala in amparo.
A similar change concerns the activities of the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, an independent body whose members are elected by the
Supreme Court. The Tribunal appoints pollworkers, investigates and
adjudicates electoral questions, declares winners, and generally oversees the electoral process.17 In the past, its decisions were not subject
to review. 7, The 1989 Law provides that amparo does not lie against
dispositions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal "in electoral matters,"
thus presumably making non-electoral matters (such as, perhaps, personnel decisions) reviewable. 172 This change is more controversial than
the parallel change permitting review of administrative decisions of
the Judicial Power. An earlier draft of the Law would have exempted
from amparo review only the Tribunal's declarations of election winners. The Supreme Court objected, arguing that the Tribunal should
enjoy independence in all electoral matters. The Legislative Assembly
broadened the exemption to conform to the Supreme Court's position.'1 Some jurists remain concerned that review in amparo of any

167. Informe, supra note 121, at 24-25, 41.
168. Law of Amparo, art. 3(b).
169. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 30(a).
170. CONSTITUCION arts. 99-102.
171. CONSTITUCION art. 103.
172. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 30(d).
173. In its 1986 draft, the Supreme Court recommended that amparo not be made available
against decisions of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in electoral matters. Corte Suprema de
Justicia, Proyecto: Ley Org-nica de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional (1986), art. 29(4). The 1989
amendment of article 10 of the Constitution, promulgated in August of that year, exempted
from the Sala's review only those acts of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that declare the
winners of elections, and the Court's 1986 recommendation that all of the Tribunal's decisions
in electoral matters be statutorily exempted from judicial review was deleted from the bill
submitted by the Assembly to the Court in 1989. The Court objected to the deletion, and the
Assembly restored the provision recommended in 1986 by the Court. See Informe, supra note
121, at 21-22.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

29

Florida Journal
of International
Law,
Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1991],
FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW Art. 1

[Vol. 6

decisions of the Tribunal may interfere with that body's ability to
continue to ensure fair elections.174
Another expansion of amparo concerns the "right of correction and
reply." Article 29 of the Constitution guarantees the right to publish
ones thoughts orally and in writing, but also provides that those who
abuse this right shall be responsible for the abuse in such manner as
may be provided by law.175 The American Convention on Human
Rights, which Costa Rica has signed and ratified, provides, inter alia,
that anyone injured by the dissemination of inaccurate or offensive
statements by a medium of communication has the right to reply or
to make a correction using the same communications outlet.176 The
Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction places the right of rectification or
reply within the amparo jurisdiction of the Sala.Although this specific right originates not in the Constitution but
in an international convention, its inclusion within the constitutional
jurisdiction of the Sala seems to be consistent with the general rule,
discussed hereinabove, that rights derived from international law in
force in Costa Rica are part of constitutional jurisdiction.1 7T Critics
emphasize that rectification and reply cases have at most an indirect
relationship to constitutional law, that most such cases are in any
event trivial, and that the Sala should not be burdened with the
factfinding that will be required in such cases.1 79
XI.

THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

A comparison of the old and new actions of unconstitutionality
properly begins with a consideration of article 10 of the Constitution.
Before the 1989 amendment, article 10 read, in pertinent part:
Dispositions of the Legislative Power or of the Executive
Power that are contrary to the Constitution shall be absolutely null ...
The Supreme Court, by vote of not less than two-thirds
of all its members, has the power to declare the unconstitutionality of dispositions of the Legislative Power and decrees
of the Executive Power.

174. Volio Interview, supra note 161.
175. CONSTITUCIoN art. 29.
176. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 14. Concerning the application of this
guarantee in Costa Rica, see FERNANDO VOLIOJIMENEZ, EL DERECHO DE RECTIFICACI6N 0
RESPUESTA (1977).

177. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, arts. 66-70.
178. Id. art. 1.
179. Volio Interview, supra note 161.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss3/1

30

Barker: Taking Constitutionalism
Seriously: Costa Rica's Sala Cuarta
COSTA RICA'S SALA CUARTA

Jurisdiction to determine the unconstitutionality of other
actions of the Executive Branch shall be determined by
law. 150
As amended in 1989, article 10 reads:
A specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court shall have
power to declare, by the vote of an absolute majority of its
members, the unconstitutionality of all legal norms of whatever nature, and of subjective exercises of Public Law. This
power shall not extend to judicial decisions of the Judicial
Power, to declarations of election made by the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal, or to such other matters as may be determined by law.ls
The most obvious change, other than the creation of the Sala itself,
is the reduced majority required for determinations of unconstitutionality. Until 1989, the votes of 12 of the 17 members of the entire
Supreme Court were required for a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Now unconstitutionality may be declared by the affirmative vote of
as few as four of the seven members of the Sala. An equally important
change is the extension of the action of unconstitutionality to cover
"norms of whatever nature." This means that municipal ordinances
and administrative rules, whose constitutionality in the past had been
decided by contentious-administrative judges in ordinary proceedings, 12 are now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sala.
The immunities previously enjoyed by the Judicial Branch and the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal have been narrowed. In the past, all rules
promulgated by those entities were immune from challenge in unconstitutionality actions, just as their other decisions were immune from
challenge in amparo.8 2 Now only judicial, as opposed to administrative, decisions of the Judicial Power and only electoral decisions of
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal enjoy immunity from actions of uncon-

stitutionality. 184

180.

CONSTITUcIoN

181.

CONSTITUCION

art. 10 (prior to 1989 amendment).
art. 10 (amended 1989).
182. See supra note 111.
183. The pre-1989 action of unconstitutionality was limited to challenging dispositions of
the Legislative and Executive Powers. See supra note 75. Regarding amparo, see Law of
Amparo, art. 3.
184. Judicial acts are exempt from the action of unconstitutionality by article 10 of the
Constitution, as are declarations of election made by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. CONSTITUc16N art. 10 (amended 1989). The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction also exempts judicial acts,
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Another change, potentially of great importance, is the final provision of the 1989 Amendment to article 10, allowing the legislature, by
ordinary statute, to create exceptions to the constitutional jurisdiction
of the Sala. Prior to the 1989 reforms, the right of the Supreme Court
to decide the constitutionality of laws and decrees was beyond the
power of the legislature to limit. The 1989 change probably reflects
both a desire to establish a measure of legislative control over the
constitutional process, and a recognition of the need to protect the
Sala from an overwhelming caseload. In any event, the provision runs
counter to the general trend of the 1989 reforms to constitutional
jurisdiction. 115 The practical significance of this newly-established legislative control is not yet clear.
The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction repeals those statutes that
had regulated the old action of unconstitutionality (recurso de inconstitucionalidad)16and establishes in their place rules for the action
of unconstitutionality (acci6n de inconstitucionalidad).187The scope of
the action is expanded to include review of certain laws for non-constitutional defects. For example, the action of unconstitutionality may
now be used to challenge the validity of statutes and treaties on
grounds that they were not adopted or approved in the manner prescribed by the internal procedural rules of the Legislative Assembly. 155
The action of unconstitutionality is now available against laws which
violate the constitution "by omission,"'1 and also against unconstitutional omissions by public authorities. 19° The former provision drew
strong objection from the Supreme Court, which noted that the Law
fails to specify what omissions are actionable.19 Some indication of the
significance of "unconstitutionality by omission" was provided in 1990,
when the Sala declared unconstitutional article 26 of the Support Law
because of its failure to provide a right of appeal, as guaranteed by

and expands the immunity of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to include all acts in electoral
matters. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 74.
185. For a criticism of this change as a "step backward," see Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, De Una
Reforma Desafortunada, LA NACION (SAN JOSE), May 3, 1989, at 15A.
186. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 113(c).
187. Id. arts. 73-95. The change of name from "recurso" to "acci6n" had long been advocated
by Dr. Ruben HernAndez Valle, who argued that the term "recurso" was a misnomer in that
it denotes but another step in the same case, whereas the unconstitutionality proceeding is,
and ever since 1938 was, a separate and distinct case. See HERN.ANDEZ, supra note 71, at 92.
188. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 73(c), (e).
189. Id. art. 73(a).
190. Id. art. 73(f).
191. Informe, supra note 121, at 44-48.
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international law. 19 The Costa Rican Constitution contains a number
of programmatic provisions obligating the government to, for example,
promote cooperatives and working-class housing and stimulate production and the adequate distribution of wealth. 19
It is not yet clear whether the Sala will consider itself empowered
to enforce these provisions by, for example, requiring the Assembly
to enact laws or to amend existing laws. As the Supreme Court pointed
out when it reviewed the pending legislation, the Law provides no
standards to guide the Sala in such situations.1- The Sala, however,
seems to be developing its own standards. In a 1990 unconstitutionality
action, the Sala declared "unconstitutional by omission" the failure of
the President and the Minister of the Treasury to adopt regulations
required by, and in implementation of, the Law of Public Sector Financial Equilibrium.1 95 The Sala said that since there is no express norm
governing the form of relief in cases of unconstitutionality by omission,
the Sala would apply, by analogy, the provision of the law of Constitutional Jurisdiction that empowers it, in cases of amparo for omission,
to fix a reasonable time within which the respondent must comply.'9
Accordingly, the Sala directed the President and the Minister of the
Treasury to promulgate regulations within two months. 9
Many basic characteristics of the unconstitutionality proceeding
remain the same. In most instances, the action of unconstitutionality
still may be commenced only by someone who is a party to a pending
case, 19 although the new Law creates important exceptions which will
be discussed below. The Law makes clear that the pending case may
be a habeas corpus or amparo proceeding.1- As in the past, a party
is permitted to bring an unconstitutionality action at any time before
the judgment in the pending case becomes final." As before, the
Procurator General is always heard in the unconstitutionality action.21

192. Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 300 de las 17:00 del 21 de marzo de 1990 (Mar. 21, 1990).
193. CONSTITUCION arts. 50, 64, 65.
194. Informe, supra note 121.
195. Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 1463-90 de las 14:30 hrs. del 30 de octubre de 1990 (Oct.
30, 1990).
196. Id.
197. Id.
1.
198. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 75,

199.

Id.

200.
201.

Id. art. 77.
Id. art. 81. The Procurator General is "neutral" in the sense that he is free to take

any position with respect to the constitutionality of the challenged law. However, as in the
past, he almost always argues for its constitutionality.
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As in the past, the parties to the underlying case have the right to
participate in the unconstitionality proceeding, but in a departure from
pre-1989 practice, the Law requires that the Sala hear oral arguments
in unconstitutionality cases.2
A major change in unconstitutionality litigation is the relaxation
of the requirement that the action be brought by someone who is a
party to a pending case in which the statute in question will or may
be applied. The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction eliminates the
"pending case" requirement whenever the unconstitutionality action
is brought by the Controller General, the Procurator General, or the
Defender of the Inhabitants, or whenever by the nature of the subject
there is no direct and individualized injury, or the interests involved
are diffused or affect people collectively. ° One criticism of the old
system had been the fact that constitutional questions could be decided
only "incidentally;" that is, only when the constitutional decision was
necessary to resolve a concrete case. 2 The Supreme Court made no
objection to this liberalization, and, in its Report to the Legislative
Assembly, noted that environmental protection and public health might
be good illustrations of matters where interests were diffuse and the
effects collective.m
In 1989, an individual citizen who was not a party to a pending
case commenced an unconstitutionality action challenging the country's
system of financing political campaigns.- The Sala held that the plaintiff asserted a "diffuse" interest, and could therefore prosecute the
action.m Several months earlier, the Sala upheld the right of an individual citizen to maintain an action of unconstitutionality challenging
the failure of the Executive Power to promulgate economic regulations
and make fiscal evaluations, as allegedly required by statute.m The
Sala concluded that the nature of the matter was such that there could
be no direct or individual injury, and therefore the plaintiff had standing.2°9 These cases suggest that the Sala is giving a broad interpretation

202. Id. arts. 10, 81, 85. The Law gives the Sala discretion to permit oral argument in
other classes of constitutional cases, but the Sala rarely does so. Id. art. 10.
203. Id. art. 75.
204. The exclusive use of the "via incidental" was criticized by, for example, Dr. Ruben
Hernndez Valle. See HERNA NDEZ, supra note 71, at 112-14.
205. Informe, supra note 121, at 52-53.
206. Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 980-91, supra note 130. This case is discussed in greater
detail infra notes 245-55 and accompanying text.
207. Id. slip op. at 5-6.
208. Sala Constitucional, supra note 130.

209.

Id.
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to the already relaxed standing requirements for unconstitutionality
actions.
Another important change concerns the effect to be given to declarations of unconstitutionality. Prior to 1989, if two-thirds of the members of the Supreme Court found a statute unconstitutional, that statute became "absolutely null. ' ' 210 When an unconstitutionality case was
decided on the merits, and there was no two-thirds vote of unconstitutionality, the statute in question was "applicable" (that is, constitutional), and subsequent actions of unconstitutionality could not be
211
brought on the same point.
Under the new system, a declaration of unconstitutionality nullifies
the unconstitutional law and eliminates it from the legal order.212
Further, the Sala now has power, once it declares the challenged law
unconstitutional, to also declare unconstitutional any other laws whose
nullification is made necessary because of their relationship to the
challenged law. 218 On the other hand, a determination by the Sala that
the challenged law is constitutional does not bar future unconstitutionality challenges of the same law.214
XII.

THE LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION

Prior to 1989, a constitutional question could be adjudicated only
if it arose out of an actual controversy between contending parties. 21 5
The 1989 reforms have significantly expanded constitutional jurisdiction by empowering the Sala to issue two types of consultative opinions
legislative and judicial. Articles 96 through 101 of the Law of
Constitutional Jurisdiction establish what has come to be called the
"legislative consultation," that is, review by the Sala of certain matters
6
pending before the Legislative Assembly.21
Article 96 provides that the Sala shall issue consultative opinions
on all proposed constitutional amendments, treaties and conventions,

210. CONSTITUCI6N art. 10 (prior to 1989 amendment).
211. Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 69, art. 967 (since repealed).
212. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 88.
213. Id. art. 89.
214. Id. art. 87.
215. As noted above, the "standing" and "pending case" requirements for unconstitutionality
actions have been relaxed by the 1989 reforms.
216. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, arts. 96-101. The 1989 amendment
of article 10 of the Constitution expressly gives the Sala power to issue consultative opinions
on proposed constitutional amendments, treaties and conventions, and other proposed laws, on
such terms as may be provided by law. CONSTITUCIoN art. 10.
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and amendments to the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.217 Other

pending legislation shall be reviewed by the Sala at the request of
any ten members of the Legislative Assembly. 218 In addition, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the Controller
General may obtain consultative opinions from the Sala on any legislative bills that affect their respective powers, 219 and the Defender of

the Inhabitants may obtain an opinion on any legislation that might
infringe any rights or liberties guaranteed by the Constitution or by
any human rights treaty in effect in the country. The opinions of
the Sala are binding only insofar as they declare the unconstitutionality
of the procedures being followed with respect to the proposed measure.- 1 In all other respects, the opinions are purely advisory. A consultative opinion does not bar a challenge to the constitutionality of
the bill or treaty once it has entered into effect.'
The legislative consultation was one of the more controversial parts
of the 1989 reforms. It was not part of the Special Commission's first
(that is, 1983) draft, but was included in the second draft, which the
Commission submitted to the Supreme Court in 1985.2 The Court
deleted all provisions for consultative jurisdiction from the version it
sent to the Legislative Assembly in 1986.- The May 1989 Amendment
of article 10 of the Constitution expressly authorized consultative jurisdiction in constitutional matters, and the Supreme Court did not object
to the inclusion of consultative jurisdiction when it reviewed the proposed Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in September 1989.M The
Court did, nevertheless, express concern that the Law fails to identify

217. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 96(a).
218. Id. art. 96(b).
219. Id. art. 96(c).
220. Id. art. 96(ch).
221. Id. art. 101,
2. For example, in November 1989, in response to a petition filed by
eleven members of the Legislative Assembly, the Sala declared that portions of the proposed
Budget Law were unconstitutional because they dealt with matters that were not budgetary in
nature, thereby violating several constitutional provisions. The Sala determined that the constitutional defects were procedural and that the decision was therefore binding. Sala Constitucional,
Voto No. 121-89 de las 11 hrs. del 23 de noviembre de 1989 (Nov. 23, 1989), 1 Jurisprudencia
Constitucional 115, 120-21.
222. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 101,
3.
223. Proyecto [de] Ley Organica de la Jurisdiction Constitucional (draft submitted by the
Commission to the Supreme Court, June 7, 1985).
224. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Ley Org~nica de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional: Exposici6n
de Motivos [y] Proyecto de Ley (May 6, 1986), at 7-8.
225. Informe, supra note 121, at 62-63.
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the factors to be considered by the Sala in formulating consultative
opinions.2
Critics of legislative consultation say that it interferes (both in
theory and in practice) with the legislative process; burdens the Sala
with matters which may be trivial, partisan and premature; and reduces the prestige of the Sala by requiring it to issue opinions that
the legislature may reject.2 An apparent anomaly, and source of
criticism, is the provision for the review of proposed constitutional
amendments. It would seem that by definition a constitutional amendment cannot be unconstitutional. Supporters of review, however, argue
that it tests the constitutionality of the procedures followed in adopting
the amendment, and also enables the Sala to warn the Assembly of
any conflicts among constitutional norms or principles that might be
created by the amendment. 2 8
Those who support the legislative consultation in all its aspects
point out that it is easier and less disruptive to correct a constitutional
mistake before the unconstitutional or discordant law has entered into
effect and been relied upon.22 9 They also maintain that the legislative
consultation provides protection for political minorities in the legislature.m

XIII.

THE JUDICIAL CONSULTATION

Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that
every judge may consult the Sala about the constitutionality of any
norm that he must apply or any. action or omission that he must

226. Id.
227. Volio Interview, supra note 161.
228. Luis Fernando Solano Carrera, La Consulta Legislativa de Constitucionalidad en Costa
Rica, Paper Presented to the Committee on Constitutional Law at the XXIX Conference of the
Inter-American Bar Association (San Jos6, Costa Rica) (Nov. 25, 1991), at 11-12.
229. Informe, supra note 121.
230. Id. By August 31, 1991, almost two years after the establishment of the current
system, the Sala had received 48 petitions for legislative consultations. Thirty of these were
reviewable as a matter of course, and the others were presented to the Sala by groups of
Deputies of the Legislative Assembly. In nine instances the Sala found substantive or procedural
defects. As one member of the Sala notes, two years is a short time in which to assess the
significance of the legislative consultation; however, he continues, the salutary effects of the
legislative consultation have already been demonstrated by the fact that the Legislative Assembly
has created a Permanent Special Committee on Constitutional Consultations and has made other
changes in its internal rules in order to adjust its operations to the new consultative power of
the Sala. Solano, supra note 228, at 23.
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decide. 231 The Sala's opinions in. judicial consultations have the same
binding effect as its decisions in actions of unconstitutionality. 232
In its 1989 review of the proposed Law, the Supreme Court objected to the entire chapter on judicial consultations because the draft
submitted to the Court would have permitted only appellate courts
to request consultative opinions.3 The Assembly amended the bill to
permit all judges to request opinions from the Sala. Some critics then
feared that judges might be tempted to overuse the consultation in
order to impress the Sala with their seriousness.2 To date, however,
more requests for consultative opinions have come from the Third
(that is, Criminal) Chamber of the Supreme Court than from any other
judge or court, and the Third Chamber would seem to have no need
to try to impress the Fourth. Some of these intramural consultations
have resulted in declarations that criminal statutes, routinely applied
for years, are unconstitutional. m Supporters of the judicial consultation
see this as evidence that the process has had the effect of heightening
judicial appreciation of due process and human cdignity.XIV.

RESOLUTION OF INTRAGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS

The 1989 Amendment of article 10 of the Constitution permits the
Sala to resolve conflicts of authority involving the branches of government, including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and such other governmental entities as may be provided by statute.- 7 The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that the Sala shall have power to
resolve conflicts of authority between the branches of government

231. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 102. The Procurator General
and the parties to the underlying case may be heard. A request for a judicial consultation does
not preclude anyone otherwise permitted to do so from commencing an action of unconstitutionality. Id. art. 105.
232. Id. art. 107.
233. Informe, supra note 121, at 63-64. The Court also objected to the provision for mandatory judicial consultations over questions of due process, right to a hearing, and the right to
a defense when these are involved in certain proceedings to open judgment (recursos de revisi6n).
This provision was retained and is part of article 102 of the Law.
234. Volio Interview, supra note 161.
235. See, e.g., Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 1059 de las 16:00 hrs. del 4 de septiembre de
1990 (Sept. 4, 1990), Cuadernos de Justicia, No. 6, at 17 (1990) (in which the Sala, in a consultative
decision requested by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court, declared unconstitutional a
provision of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure).
236. Solano, supra note 228, at 1, n.1. For a summary of both legislative and judicial
consultations, see Eduardo Sancho, La Consulta en la Jurisdicci6nConstitucional,CUADERNOS
DE JUSTICIA, No. 6, at 5 (1990).
237.

CONSTITUciON art. 10(a) (amended 1989).
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(including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal), or between any of them
and the Controller General.m The Law further provides that the Sala
shall also resolve conflicts of authority involving municipalities, decentralized agencies, and other governmental entities (including conflicts
between any of the branches of government, the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, or the Controller General) where those conflicts are based
on constitutional grants of authority.3 9 The difference in language
indicates that all conflicts of authority among the major organs of
government are within the Sala's jurisdiction, regardless of the legal
basis of the dispute, while conflicts involving lesser units of government are within the Sala's jurisdiction only when a constitutional allocation of power is in question. In every case, the process is commenced
by a petition by the head of any one of the entities involved in the
conflict. o
The Special Commission of the Ministry of Justice had recommended the creation of broad "conflict jurisdiction," but the Supreme
Court's 1986 draft provided for the resolution of conflicts only among
the "Supreme Organs of State."2 1 The Assembly, however, restored
the broader jurisdiction proposed by the Special Commission, and in
its 1989 review, the Court did not object to the creation of conflict
jurisdiction which encompasses lesser entities.A Critics of conflict
jurisdiction are concerned that since neither "conflict" nor "head" (of
the entity) is defined, there is a danger that petty differences between
3
administrators will be converted into constitutional disputes.-

XV.

REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL VETO

The 1989 reforms leave judicial review of the presidential veto-forunconstitutionality unchanged, except that review is now exercised
by the Sala rather than the full Supreme Court, and declarations of
unconstitutionality now require only a majority vote.2 "

238. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 109(a).
239. Id. art. 109(b).
240. Id. art. 110.
241. Corte Suprena de Justicia, supra note 224, at 64-67.
242. Informe, supra note 121, at 64-65.
243. Volio Interview, supra note 161. However, during its first year, the Sala received
only three conflict cases. 1.571 Casos PresentadosAnte la Sala IV, supra note 165.

244. These changes were accomplished by the amendment of article 128 of the Constitution.
The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction makes no mention of review of the veto-for-unconstitutionality.
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OVERVIEW

In the summer of 1991, a number of prominent Costa Rican jurists
were asked whether there was any one constitutional decision which,
more than any other, demonstrated the significance of the 1989 reforms. Almost all of them identified the same case, an unconstitutionality action decided by the Sala on May 24, 1991.A lawyer named Estela Quesada commenced the action in the Fall
of 1989, challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the
Electoral Code and one provision of the Constitution itself, all of which
had to. do with government funding of political campaigns. Most of
the plaintiff's challenges were directed at the eligibility requirements
for funding, the kinds of activities funded, the timing of the payments,
and the allocation of governmental responsibility for administering the
funding program. The plaintiff alleged that the challenged statutes
violated a number of constitutional norms and principles, and that the
constitutional provision in question was unconstitutional because it
had been adopted (as a constitutional amendment in 1971) in a manner
which did not satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Order and Discipline of the Legislative Assembly governing
the amendment process.
The plaintiff was not a party to any pending lawsuit in which the
challenged provisions might be applied. She contended, however, that
she was asserting a "collective right of political association" sufficient
to give her standing to maintain an action of unconstitutionality without a separate, pending case.- 7 The Procurator General argued that
to conclude that the plaintiff had standing would be to convert the
action of unconstitutionality into a "popular action," by which anyone
could challenge any law, something not intended by the drafters of
the reforms.- On the merits, the Procurator General opposed all but
one of the plaintiff's claimsA' 9
The Sala concluded that the right asserted by the plaintiff was
not, as she contended, "collective," but rather that her interest in
political association was "diffuse" in that it was equal and identical to
the right of all other citizens, and that she therefore had standing to
pursue the action.? ° On the merits, the Sala held the challenged con-

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 980-91, supra note 130.
Id. slip op. at 1-3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 5-6.
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stitutional provision (those portions of article 96 which provide for
advance payments to political parties) unconstitutional because the
language in question had not been approved by a two-thirds majority
of two separate sessions of the Assembly, as required by the Constitution, but rather had been added to the text of the proposed amendment
during the second session. 5 1 In addition, the Sala held the eligibility
requirements for funding (generally based on past electoral performance) unconstitutional in that they gave undue preference to the two
major political parties, thereby violating what the Sala found to be
2
the constitutional principle of a multiparty system.
The Sala also found unconstitutional a number of requirements for
the organization and registration of political parties because, the Sala
said, they violated article 98 of the Constitution (which guarantees
the right to form political parties) as well as principles established by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Convention
on Human Rights, and other international conventions.2 Various other
statutes, including some not challenged by the plaintiff, were held to
violate one or another constitutional guarantee, and the remaining
statutes challenged in the action were found not to be unconstitutional.- The holdings were followed by an order that the declarations
of unconstitutionality made in the case would operate to nullify the
unconstitutional laws with respect to the 1994 elections and all elections
thereafter, but not with respect to the elections held in or before
1990.2 5 The opinion of the Sala was unanimous.
The case illustrates many of the reforms made in 1989: the more
liberal standing requirements;2- the power of the Sala to decide issues
not raised by the parties;- 7 the quasi-constitutional status of international human rights law and the internal rules of the Legislative Assembly;- the power of the Sala to discover and apply "constitutional
principles '' 9 and the discretion given the Sala to determine the retroactivity, if any, of its declarations of unconstitutionality. ° All of

251. Id. at 18-21.
252. Id. at 6-7, 12-13.
253. Id. at 11-12.
254. Id. at 35-38.
255. Id. at 38.
256. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 75, 2.
257. Article 13 of Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, provides that once a
matter is properly before the Sala, that body may act "de oficio."
258. CONSTITUCION art. 10; Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, arts. 2(a),
(b), 73(c), (e).
259. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, arts. 1, 73(a), (b).
260. Id. art. 91.
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these innovations are either required or expressly permitted by the
Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. Other significant developments are
not found in positive legislation. In this case, as in many others, the
Sala has held laws unconstitutional on three or four grounds, any one
of which would have been sufficient to nullify the law. 261 Also, the
Sala has decided, as a matter of policy, not to rely on decisions made
under the pre-1989 system. 2-2 Indeed, as a general matter, the Sala
rarely cites any authorities other than the statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions under consideration.2The most obvious result of the 1989 reforms has been the expansion
of constitutional jurisdiction. All of the old forms of action have been
broadened, and new proceedings have been established. The very
meaning of "unconstitutionality" has been enlarged. The changes are
in the aggregate are a movement away from the United States model
of constitutional adjudication and toward Continental European models. The concentration of adjudicatory authority in a single, specialized
tribunal is a hallmark of continental systems, as is the practice of
deciding constitutional questions in the abstract. 2s The idea that con-

261. Sala Constitucional, supra note 130, slip op. at 11-12; see also Sala Constitucional Voto
No. 1147-90, del 21 de septiembre del 1990 (Sept. 21, 1990) (an unconstitutionality action in
which the Sala held that a provision of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power violated articles
33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45 and 73 of the Convention of the International Labor Organization).
262. Interview with the seven magistrates of the Sala Constitucional, in San Jos6, Costa
Rica (June 18, 1991) [hereinafter Seven Magistrates Interview].
263. However, as its own jurisprudence increases, the Sala frequently supports its opinions
by references to its own prior decisions; e.g., Sala Constitucional, Vote No. 980-91, supra note
130, slip op. at 8-9.
264. The idea of entrusting control of constitutionality to a single, specialized body, is
generally traced to the French Tribunal de Cassation, established in 1790 as an arm of the
legislature. The Austrian Constitution of 1920 established a centralized system of judicial review
of constitutional questions by a constitutional court. Italy, Spain, and Germany are now among
the countries that follow the "Austrian model" of concentrated jurisdiction (as distinguished
from the "American [i.e., United States] model," in which judicial review may be exercised by
all judges). The Austrian Constitution of 1920 also created a special plea for the review of
constitutional questions, with the result that constitutional adjudication was dissociated from
concrete controversies. MAURO CAPPELLErI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 45-77 (1971). Many present-day European systems provide for both "direct review" of
constitutional questions (that is, review without any underlying case), and "indirect review"
(that is, review by the constitutional court of a question raised in the course of an ordinary
lawsuit). See, e.g., Alessandro Pizzorusso et al., The Constitutional Review of Legislation in
Italy, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 503 (1983). But whether review is direct or indirect, constitutional resolution
is separated from the adjudication of an actual case or controversy. Costa Rica's decision to
vest constitutional jurisdiction in a special chamber of the Supreme Court was the result of a
compromise. Some of those deeply involved in the 1989 reforms, such as Dr. Ruben Herndndez
Valle, had long advocated the establishment of a constitutional court, which would not be part
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stitutional decision-making is incidental to the ordinary judicial function of deciding contentious cases2 has been replaced by the concept
- and the reality - of control of constitutionality by a special tribunal
whose only function is to protect the Constitution.
The most obvious effect of the 1989 reforms has been a tremendous
increase in constitutional litigation. During the first six months of the
new system, the number of habeas corpus petitions filed in the Sala
was almost twice the number filed in the Supreme Court during the
corresponding period a year earlier; unconstitutionality actions increased by more than 700%, and amparo petitions increased tenfold.26
Less obvious, but no less important, is the Sala's activist spirit. -7 The
Sala has come close to realizing an important objective of some proponents of the 1989 reforms: the abolition of any presumption in favor
of the constitutionality of statutes.m
The new judicial activism is demonstrated more by the Sala's words
than by any statistics. In concluding that the plaintiff Quesada had
standing to challenge the campaign-financing laws, the Sala explained
that were it to hold otherwise, the laws in question might never be
tested.2 6 9 The presumption underlying this statement - that every

of the

Judicial

Power.

RUBEN

STITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES

HERNANDEZ

VALLE,

EL

CONTROL

DE

LA

CON-

117-24 (1978). In 1982, when the Special Commission began

its work on a draft law of constitutional jurisdiction, the Supreme Court agreed to participate
in the project only on the condition that the Commission would not propose to diminish the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Gutibrrez, supra note 118, at 13. Accordingly, the draft laws
prepared by the Special Commission proposed to concentrate constitutional jurisdiction in the
full Supreme Court. In the Legislative Assembly, the advocates of a separate "constitutional
court" and the defenders of the traditional prerogatives of the Supreme Court compromised by
vesting constitutional jurisdiction in a specialized tribunal within the Supreme Court. Interview
with Lic. Alejandro Rodriguez Vega, President of the Constitutional Chamber (June 1, 1990).
265. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
266. Corte Suprema de Justicia Sala Constitucional, Informe Estdtstico Interno, 27 de
sept. 1989 - 27 de feb. 1990, at 5 (1990) [hereinafter Informe Estadistico Interno].
267. In explaining the decision of the Sala not to rely upon pre-1989 decisions, Dr. Rodolfo
Piza Escalante, a member of the Sala, observed, "[wie are in a new era." Seven Magistrates
Interview, supra note 262.
268. Dr. Rubbn Hernndez Valle, who prepared the first draft of the reforms in 1983 and
participated in all subsequent stages of the reform effort, had long criticized the old system for
its adherence to the principle (implicit in the two-thirds rule and often stated by the Supreme
Court) that laws are presumed to be constitutional. HERNANDEZ, supra note 264, at 110-12.
On the other hand, the Sala has often refused to attribute an unconsitutional meaning to a
statute if the language is susceptible of an interpretation that is consistent with the Constitution.
Voto No. 447-91 de las 15:30 del 21 de febrero de 1991, slip op. at 6; Voto No. 1090-91 del 16:15
del 11 de junio de 1991, slip op. at 3-4.
269. Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 980-91 supra note 130. Presumably a political party,
involved in ordinary litigation over funding, could commence an unconstitutionality action, thus
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constitutional question is justiciable - would seem to be of the essence
of judicial activism. Another important example is the willingness of
the Sala to look behind the assertions of regularity made by other
branches of government, and even beyond the allegations of the parties, to find unconstitutionality. In 1990, the Sala heard unconstitutionality actions in which private parties challenged various provisions of
the Forestry Law and the Landlord-Tenant Law. Even though the
plaintiffs in these cases alleged only that certain provisions of the laws
were unconstitutional, the Sala decided in both cases that the process
by which the Legislative Assembly enacted the laws was unconstitutional, and therefore declared both laws unconstitutional in their en-

tirety. 270
The Sala has acquired a prominence in day-to-day public affairs
that is unprecedented in the history of the country's judiciary21 and
the decisions of the Sala have substantially affected many areas of
national policy. Because of the Sala, the country's system of campaign
financing has been changed,- layoffs of public employees have been
suspended,- legislators' perquisites have been limited,- 4 and persons
arrested without probable cause have been released and awarded damages.2 5 Between February, 1979 and March, 1982, under the previous

satisfying the general requirement of a pending case. However, the Sala, having determined
that citizens' rights of political association were involved, was evidently concerned that the
individual citizen be able to vindicate her rights.
270. The Landlord-Tenant Law was declared unconstitutional in Voto No. 479-90 de 11 de
mayo de 1990 (May 11, 1990); the Forestry Law in Voto No. 546-90 de las 14:30 hrs. del 22 de
mayo de 1990 (May 22, 1990). The basis of both decisions was article 45 of the Constitution
which guarantees the right of property and provides that a law limiting that right must be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly. The Sala held that the laws in
question did limit the right of property, and determined that they had not received the required
38 votes.
271. The best evidence of this the amount of coverage given the Sala by the country's
newspapers and radio and television stations, day in and day out. Four excellent op-ed pieces
which illustrate the range of thoughtful defenses and criticisms of the Sala are found in LA
NACI(N, Apr. 14, 1991, at 15A-16A, and a similarly high-quality discussion took place on a
panel discussion about the Sala on the television program En la Mira (June 19, 1991).
272. Urge Ley ParaFinanciarPartidos, LA NACI6N, May 26, 1991, at 5A. The case is
discussed hereinabove.
273. Sala IV FrenaDespidos en el MOPT, LA REPUBLICA (SAN JOSE), Apr. 11, 1991, at
4A. The Sala ordered that the 116 employees in question be reinstated in their jobs pending
final judgment in their amparo action against the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.
274. Gollerahs de los Diputados, LA REPUBLICA, Sept. 8, 1990, at 12A.
275. See, e.g., Jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en Materia de Derecho Penal,
Procesal Penal y Penitenciario,CUADERNos DE JURISPRUDENCIA, No. 4 (1990), and cases
cited therein.
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system, the Supreme Court invalidated laws or other governmental
actions in three unconstitutionality cases, eleven habeas corpus cases,
and three amparocases. V6 Between October, 1989 and mid-June, 1991,
under the new system, the Sala had made 216 determinations of unconstitutional governmental conduct in habeas corpus and amparo
cases alone. 7
It would be beyond the scope of this article, and beyond the competence of the author, to attempt to evaluate the merits of these
decisions; but the significance of the Sala and of the 1989 reforms
transcends the debate over any particular decision or line of decisions.
The Sala, and the reforms which it has brought to life, have generated
a new spirit of constitutionalism in an already-democratic society. Time
may bring about some moderation in the volume and pace of constitutional litigation, and some adjustments may be made in the system. 278
However that may be, the 1989 reforms have brought about basic
changes which are likely to endure and to reinforce Costa Rican democracy. Few could disagree with the words of Dr. Alejandro Rodriguez
Vega, the first President of the Sala: "The new ideas about the effective enforcement of fundamental rights, about the normative value of
the Constitution, and about the transformation of the 'rule of law' into
the 'rule of constitutional law,' have brought about a thoroughgoing
7
revolution in Constitutional Justice in Costa Rica."
XVII.

UPDATE

Since the foregoing article was submitted for publication, the
amount of constitutional litigation in Costa Rica has increased significantly and the activism of the Sala has continued to be a subject of
intense debate. On July 24, 1992, the Sala itself proposed a number
of changes in the system established by the 1989 reforms. The proposals have received support from government, and opposition legis-

276.

MARINA ALEJANDRA & GERARDO ALBERTO TREJOS, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITU-

CIONAL 1979-1982: DIGESTO DE JURISPRUDENCIA 145-47 (1982).

277. Estado Recibe 216 Condenas de Sala IV, LA NACI6N, June 23, 1991, at 5A.
278. There is a consensus that something must be done to moderate the workload of the
Sala. It has been suggested that a special inferior tribunal be created to hear amparo cases in
the first instance, with the possibility of review by the Sala. En la Mira, supra note 271. The
Sala itself has recommended that the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction be amended to suspend
for five years the time limits imposed -on the Sala for the resolution of cases. See Informe
Estadtstico Interno, supra note 266, app.
279. Alejandro Rodriguez Vega, El Control de Constitucionalidad en Costa Rica, Paper
Presented at the XXIX Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association (San Jose, Costa
Rica) (Nov. 25, 1991), at 1-2.
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lators, and from the President of the Republic. The proposals offer
insight into many of the issues discussed hereinabove, and indicate
the probable direction of future reforms. This update has been added
in order to summarize those proposals.
The Sala's recommendations are set forth in a document addressed
to the Legislative Assembly, the Executive Branch and the full Supreme Court.m The Sala characterizes the 1989 reforms as beneficial
to the country and describes its own experience as a rich one. 2s1 However, the document continues, the ever-increasing volume of constitutional litigation presents a serious problem, necessitating changes in
the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. 21 The following chart, based
on figures compiled by the Sala, illustrates the problem:
Caseload of the Sala Constitucional28
Oct.-Dec.
1989

Jan.-Dec.
1990

Jan.-Dec.
1991

Jan.-June
1992
2,131

Number of Cases
Commenced

407

2,297

3,550

Number of Cases
Decided

292

1,591

2,207

To deal with the caseload problem, the Sala proposes its own division into panels, the establishment of procedures for prior review of
habeas corpus and amparo claims, the imposition of stricter standing
requirements in unconstitutionality cases, and the limitation of oral
argument.
In addition, the Sala proposes amendments designed to
reduce the disruptive effects of constitutional litigation on other tribunals and on society at large. 28
A. Division of the Sala into Panels
Since its creation, the Sala has always decided all cases en banc.
The Sala now proposes that it be divided into two panels for the

280. Sala Constitucional, Proyecto de Reformas a la Ley de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional:
Proyecto Propuesto por la Sala Constitucional a la Asamblea Legislativa, al Poder Ejecutivo y
a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, 24 de julio de 1992 (July 24, 1992) [hereinafter Proyecto de
Reformas].
281. Id. at 3.
282. Id. at 3-4.
283. Id. at 4-5.
284. Id. at 6-14.
285. Id. at 14.
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purpose of considering and deciding habeas corpus and amparo cases.
Amparo petitions account for two-thirds of the Sala's caseload and
most of its backlog, while habeas corpus petitions constitute another
twenty percent of its caseload.2 By working in panels, the Sala believes that it will be able to resolve habeas corpus and amparo cases
more expeditiously. 287 Under the proposal, the Sala would continue to
function en banc in unconstitutionality cases, consultations, and intragovernmental conflicts, as well in those habeas corpus and amparo
cases which present novel questions.m
B.

PriorReview of Habeas Corpus and Amparo Cases

The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction gives the Sala original and
exclusive jurisdiction in all habeas corpus and amparo cases. The Sala
now proposes the establishment of a system of prior review of amparo
and habeas corpus claims. Amparo petitioners would be required to
assert their claims before the agency responsible for the alleged wrongdoing; only when relief is denied by the agency would a claim be
reviewable by the Sala.m In habeas corpus, the aggrieved party could
elect to proceed either directly before the Sala or before the public
authority responsible for the alleged illegal restraint; in the latter
situation, the Sala would review all denials of relief.m
C.

Suspensive Effect of Amparo Actions

At the present time, commencing an amparo action operates to
protect the petitioner from the conduct complained of during the pen-

286. The Sala's statistics concerning the constitutional cases commenced and resolved from
October 1989 through June 1992 are as follows:
Cases Decided
Cases Commenced
(almost 100%)
1,674
Habeas Corpus
(approx. 65%)
5,552
Ampar0
974
(approx. 50%)
Unconstitutionality
(approx. 50%)
115
Judicial Consultations
66
66
Legislative Consultations
4
4
Conflicts
Id. at 5.
287. Id. at 7.
288. Id. at 7-8.
289. Id. at 8-9. Prior to the 1989 reforms, habeas corpus cases were heard by the full
Supreme Court, and amparo cases were heard by a chamber of the Court. See supra notes 95,
108 & 109. Similar proposals to require prior review of amparo claims have been advanced since
at least early 1991. See supra note 278.
290. Proyecto de Reformas, supra note 280, at 8-9.
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dency of the amparo action, unless the Sala determines otherwise.2 1
The Sala points out that although about forty percent of amparo claims
are so obviously deficient that they are dismissed preliminarily, the
filing of even the least substantial amparo petition usually causes a
one- or two-week suspension of some (usually governmental) activity.
The Sala proposes that during the pendency of an amparo action, the
respondent be restrained from engaging in the conduct complained of
only when the Sala decides that the private interest of the petitioner
outweighs the public interest in the activity in question.D.

Standing Requirements for Plaintiffs in
Unconstitutionality Actions

In liberalizing the standing requirements for actions of unconstitutionality, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that a person
who is asserting a "diffuse" or "collective" interest may prosecute an
unconstitutionality action even if he is not a party to a pending case
in which the allegedly unconstitutional statute or regulation might be
applied.
The Sala recommends elimination of this exception to the
"pending case" requirement because the exception has proved difficult
to apply and has led to the commencement of unconstitutionality actions by persons who have no substantial connection to the controversy. 25
The Sala also notes that the provision of the Law eliminating the
"pending case" requirement where "by the nature of the matter there
is no individual or direct injury," is also undesirable; but the Sala does
not recommend elimination of this exemption.2
E.

Suspensive Effect of the Action of Unconstitutionality

The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction provides that once the Sala
determines that the petition in an unconstitutionality action meets the
formal requirements of the Law, notice of the action is published in
the Boletin Judicialand that publication operates to prohibit all courts
and administrative agencies in the country from entering judgment in
any case involving the statute or regulation whose constitutionality is
291. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 41.
292. Proyecto de Reformas, supra note 280, at 10.
293. Id. at 9-10. The Sala's proposal would restore the rule that prevailed prior to the 1989
reforms. See supra note 137.
294. Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 75.
295. Proyecto de Reformas, supra note 280, at 11-12.
296. Id. The Sala's preference for traditional "standing" requirements is in interesting
contrast to the more liberal attitude taken by the Supreme Court when it reviewed the proposed
Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in August and September 1989. Informe, supra note 121, at
52-53.
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challenged until the Sala has decided the unconstitutionality action.o
The amendment proposed by the Sala would continue to prohibit the
entry of judgment in the pending case of the unconstitutionality
petitioner, but would permit the entry of judgment in all other cases,
subject to modification in accordance with the Sala's decision in the
unconstitutionality action.2
F.

Oral Argument

The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction makes oral argument mandatory in unconstitutionality actions and discretionary with the Sala
in all other cases.- The Sala's experience has convinced it that most
oral arguments are little more than restatements of the parties' written
briefs, and therefore are usually an unprofitable use of time." The
Sala proposes that it be given discretion in all cases to decide whether
oral argument shall take place."o1
The Sala's proposals are clearly designed to deal with the most
serious and most obvious problems of the current system - the huge
caseload and the disruptive effects of frivolous suits - without discouraging the litigation of substantial claims. The proposals are in
every respect traditional. It is not unusual in Civil Law countries for
high courts to function in panels in all but the most important cases,
and for injured persons to be required to seek relief from tribunals
that are close-at-hand before approaching the highest court in the
nation. Similarly, one must usually be able to show a probability of
ultimate success and the likelihood of irreparable harm before obtaining
preliminary relief.
The Sala's proposal to restore the "pending case" requirement in
certain situations, and its apparent preference for such a requirement
in all unconstitutionality cases go to the heart of the debate over the
nature of judicial review. Should judges have power to decide constitutional questions only because, as Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison,
such decisions are sometimes necessary to the resolution of genuine
lawsuits? Or should judges (or at least some judges) be vested with
general power to decide constitutional questions? It would be beyond
the scope of this article to debate the nature of judicial review, but
it is important to note that this debate is part of Costa Rica's ongoing
effort to perfect an already exemplary constitutional system.

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 81.
Proyecto de Reformas, supra note 280, at 12-13.
Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 122, art. 10.
Proyecto de Reformas, supra note 280, at 13.
Id. at 13-14. The Sala has only rarely exercised its discretion to allow oral argument.
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